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Supervisor: Russell Cooper
My dissertation focuses on the heterogeneity in labor markets. The first
chapter proposes an explanation for the unemployment rate difference between skill
groups. Low skill workers (workers without a four year college degree) have a higher
unemployment rate. The reason for that “... is mainly because they (low skill work-
ers) are more likely to become unemployed, not because they remain unemployed
longer, once unemployed” (Layard, Nickell, Jackman, 1991, p.44). This chapter
proposes an explanation for the difference in job separation probabilities between
these skill groups: high skill workers have lower job separation probabilities as they
are selected more effectively during the hiring process. I use a labor search model
with match specific quality to quantify the explanatory power of this hypothesis
on differences in job separation probabilities and unemployment rates across skill
groups.
The second chapter analyzes the effects of one channel of interaction (job
competition) between skill groups on their labor market outcomes. Do skilled work-
ers prefer unskilled jobs to being unemployed? If so, skilled workers compete with
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unskilled workers for those jobs. Job competition generates interaction between the
labor market outcomes of these groups. I use a heterogeneous agents model with
skilled and unskilled workers in which the only interaction across groups is the job
competition. Direct effects of job competition are reducing skilled unemployment
rate (since they have a bigger market) and increasing the unskilled unemployment
rate (since they face greater competition). However number of vacancies respond
to job competition in equilibrium. For instance, unskilled firms have incentives to
open more vacancies since filling a vacancy is easier if there is job competition. Thus
how unskilled unemployment and wages are affected by job competition depends on
which effect dominates. The results for reasonable parameter values show that job
competition does reduce the average unemployment rate. It reduces the skilled
unemployment rate more, generating an increase in unemployment rate inequality.
However, the employment rate at skilled jobs is unaffected.
The third chapter focuses on skill biased technological change. Skill biased
technological change is one of the explanations for the asymmetry between labor
market outcomes of skill groups over the last few decades. However, during this time
period there were also skill neutral shocks that could contribute to these outcomes.
The third chapter analyzes the effects of skill biased and neutral shocks on overall
labor market variables. I use a model in which skilled and unskilled outputs are
intermediate goods, and final good sector receives all the shocks. A numerical
exercise shows that both skilled and unskilled unemployment rates respond to shocks
in the same direction. The response of unemployment rate to skill neutral shocks
is bigger than the response to skill biased shocks for both skill groups. However,
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the unskilled unemployment changes more than the skilled unemployment rate as a
response to skill neutral shocks. Thus, skill neutral shocks reduce the unemployment
rate gap between skill groups.
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Chapter 1
Selection, Separation, and Unemployment
1.1 Introduction
This paper explores unemployment rate differences across skill groups. I
extend the empirical evidence on the difference in the unemployment experiences
across skill groups to date using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data. As it
is well documented, low skill workers have a higher unemployment rate than high
skill workers. However, it is less known that the difference in unemployment rate by
skill is mostly due to the difference in the job separation probabilities. This paper
proposes an explanation for differences in job separation probabilities across skill
groups: Firms use different selection procedures when hiring workers for vacancies
with different skill requirements.
I use data from the CPS, between January 1976 and November 2007, on
prime age males to document the skill differences in unemployment experiences.1
Over the sample period, low skill workers had, on average, twice the unemployment
rate of high skill workers. The difference in the job finding probability between
skill groups is not large enough to cause the unemployment rate difference between
these groups. The reason for the higher unemployment of low skill workers is not
because they cannot find jobs. Furthermore, low skill workers, compared to high
1The details of the data and the calculations are discussed in more detail in the next section.
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skill workers, have approximately three times higher probability of becoming unem-
ployed. The dispersion in the job separation probability (probability of becoming
unemployed) by skill is the basis of the difference in unemployment rate these skill
groups face.
The purpose of this paper is to further our understanding of the difference
in job separation probabilities between skill groups. One should note that there
are several possible reasons for this gap. One such explanation is the following:
Firms with high skill vacancies have a higher opportunity cost of not hiring the best
workers for the job. Consequently, firms who are looking for high skill workers follow
more effective hiring strategies and screening processes than they would have done
if searching for low skill workers. As a result of the more effective selection, high
skill vacancies get higher quality matches, which are less likely to be terminated.
I use a discrete time infinite horizon labor matching model with heterogenous
agents. There are two different skill groups in the economy. For simplicity, there is
no interaction between these skill groups. For each skill group, a match between the
firm and the worker can be either good or bad quality. The only difference between
skill groups is that a good quality, high skill match produces a higher output than a
good quality, low skill match. The true quality of the match is revealed after parties
observe the output. Firms and workers learn about the probability of the match
being good quality before they form the match, and they decide whether to form
the match and produce or to continue searching. The probability of a match being
good quality is drawn from a distribution, which is the selection technology. There
are two technologies available: a costless employee selection technology, and a more
2
effective but costly employee selection technology. The more effective technology
has a higher likelihood of delivering high quality matches.
I calibrate the model to match some data facts of the US labor markets.
The model predicts that, in equilibrium, only high skill firms employ the more
effective selection technology. As a result, high skill firms often get high quality
matches, resulting in a lower job separation rate. The model also delivers, although
not targeted directly, the observed magnitudes of the job separation probability
disparities across skill groups.
To my knowledge, there are only two other papers that propose an explana-
tion for the difference in job separation probabilities across skill. Moscarini (2002)
quantifies the match specific capital and analyzes its implications for wage inequal-
ity. In his model, low skill workers have a comparative disadvantage in market work
(lower wedge between productivity and opportunity cost of work). Thus, low skill
workers do not tolerate mismatches and separate to unemployment more often than
the high skill workers.
Nagypal (2007) focuses on the difference in the levels and the standard de-
viations of unemployment rate across skill. Nagypal has a different explanation for
the differences in job separation probabilities. Nagypal explains that the existence
of match specific capital (information about the quality of a match) for high skill
workers and the lack of such capital for low skill workers make low skill employment
relations more vulnerable to adverse idiosyncratic shocks. Nagypal uses a matching
model with firms employing both high and low skill workers, and with uncertainty
regarding match quality for high skill jobs. Firms’ decisions to terminate a high
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skill match, when faced with an adverse idiosyncratic shock, depend on the accumu-
lated information about the quality of that match. Nagypal constructs a numerical
example to show that differences in learning about the match quality can generate
differences in unemployment rates.
This paper is complementarity to Nagypal (2007) in the following way. Both
papers agree that there is uncertainty regarding the match quality. There are two
means through which firms and workers can learn about the quality of their match.
First is that, they can extract some information regarding the quality before they
form the employment relationship. The second is that, they can form the employ-
ment relationship and learn through the job tenure. This paper looks at the former
means of learning while Nagypal (2007) looks at the latter form of learning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section of the paper
provides recent evidence on the hiring policies and unemployment experiences of
different skill groups. Section two lays out the model. The equilibrium of the model
is defined and analyzed in section three. Section four has the quantitative results of
the model and is followed by concluding remarks.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Unemployment Facts
This section talks about the data on unemployment experiences of skill
groups in more detail. To document the skill differences in unemployment, I use
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CPS data from January 1976 to November 20072. I focus on prime age males (ages
of 25 to 50), since they have the strongest labor market attachment among labor
market participants. Following the standard definition of skill in the literature, I
use education level as a proxy for skill. Workers without a college degree are low
skill while those with at least 16 years of education (a college degree) are high skill
workers.
To do the following calculations, I construct flow data by merging every two
consecutive months of the CPS and seasonally adjust the flow data3.
The unemployment rate is calculated as the ratio of the number of the un-
employed in a particular month to the size of the labor force in that month for each
skill group. Figure 1.1 illustrates the skill differentials in unemployment rates4. Al-
though unemployment rates of both skill groups follow similar trends, the high skill
unemployment rate is always below the low skill unemployment rate.
There are two determinants of unemployment. The first one is the job find-
ing probability whereas the second one is the job separation probability. The job
finding probability in a given month is the fraction of unemployed in the previous
month that have become employed in the current month. Figure 1.2 shows the
job finding probabilities of skill groups. Low skill workers, on average, have higher
job finding probabilities than high skill workers. Job finding probabilities are not
2CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households. It is the primary source of information on
the labor force characteristics of the U.S. population. The CPS is conducted by the Census Bureau
for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The web site for the Survey is: http://www.census.gov/cps.
The data can be downloaded from http://www.nber.org/data/cps basic.html
3In doing so, I use the Stata codes made available by Robert Shimer. Codes can be downloaded
from http://robert.shimer.googlepages.com/flows
4Data in all figures are quarterly averages of monthly values.
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Figure 1.1: Unemployment Rates by Skill Groups
the main reasons for unemployment rate differences between skill groups. One can
also look at unemployment duration across skill groups. Although duration data
reveal a slightly longer duration for low skill workers (which would imply a lower
job finding probability for this group), the difference is still not big enough for job
finding probabilities to be the main actor of unemployment rate disparity. Moreover,
Tristao (2007) uses National Longitudinal Survey of Youth-795 data and looks at
the unemployment duration for detailed occupation groups. Low skill occupations
have durations close to the overall average. Thus job finding probabilities are not
different enough to cause the differences in unemployment rates.
The second determinant, the job separation rate, is also from merged CPS
data. The job separation probability in a given month is the fraction of workers who
were employed in the previous month, but are reported to be unemployed in the
5For more information see http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.htm.
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Figure 1.2: Job Finding Probabilities by Skill Groups
current month. Figure 1.3 illustrates the job separation probabilities of skill groups
over time. High skill workers have substantially lower rates than low skill workers.
Note that the graph for separation rates resembles the graph for unemployment
rates.
These facts are robust to several different specifications of the data. I analyze
the difference between skill groups in unemployment that is not due to lay-offs. The
CPS collects data on the reason for unemployment after 1994. Over the period of
1994 to 2007, the average unemployment rate is 4.9 percent for low skill workers,
and it is 2.1 percent for high skill workers. If we look only at unemployment for
reasons other than lay-offs, the average unemployment rate is 3.9 percent and 1.9
percent for low and high skill workers, respectively. Clearly, lay-offs affect low skill
workers more; however, higher lay-offs of low skill workers are not significant enough
to account for the difference in unemployment rates.
7
Figure 1.3: Job Separation Probabilities by Skill Groups
These data facts are also robust to the cutoff for high and low-skill. Counting
workers with some college education as high skill does change quantitative results
but not enough for the gap to vanish or decrease significantly. Moreover, the gap
in the unemployment rate and the job separation probability is significant for more
detailed categories of skill.
Table 1.1: Data Summary
Unemployment Job Finding Separation
Rate Probability Probability
All .042 .34 .014
(.01) (.05) (.003)
Low-skill* .051 .34 .017
(.02) (.06) (.004)
High-Skill .02 .33 .006
(.006) (.07) (.002)
Monthly averages of prime age male data between 1976 and
2007
* Workers with less than a college degree
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Observe that the separation rates given above are for the separations to
unemployment. It is also informative to look at job separations that did not result
in unemployment: job to job transitions. The CPS started, in 1994, to ask employed
workers whether they are with the same employer as they were the previous month.
During the 1994 -2007 period, less than two percent of employed workers in each skill
group changed employers. Although there is a slight difference in numbers by skill,
low skill workers have substantially larger job separation probabilities (regardless of
the destination of the separation).
Table 1.1 summarizes unemployment experiences by skill group. Between
January 1976 and November 2007, low skill workers experienced an average unem-
ployment rate of five percent whereas high skill workers faced two percent. Moreover,
low skill workers had a slightly better chance of finding jobs than their high skill
counterparts. The data reveal that low skill workers have higher unemployment
rates for the reason that they have higher job separation probabilities.
The skill difference in unemployment experiences is also documented by
other authors. Mincer (1991) uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data on the
male labor force. He finds that higher levels of education reduce the risk of unem-
ployment. The difference in the incidence of unemployment is more important than
the difference in unemployment durations for educational differences in unemploy-
ment. Nagypal (2007) uses March Supplements and Displaced Worker Supplements
of the CPS. She also finds differences in unemployment by education. Moreover, the
differences in unemployment duration by education are not large enough to account
for the differences in unemployment rates. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) use
9
managerial vs. manual occupations, and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) use wages
as a proxy for skill, and find a higher unemployment rate for low skill workers.
1.2.2 Hiring Processes
This section of the paper presents the data facts on employee selection and
its differentials by skill. Van Ours and Ridder (1992) analyze the selection process
of employers using Dutch establishment data. Van Ours and Ridder show that firms
form an applicant pool shortly after (within the first two weeks) the vacancy has
been posted, and the rest of the vacancy duration is used to select a new employee
from that pool of applicants. They show that 80 percent of vacancies are filled with
applicants who applied for the job within the first two weeks of the vacancy opening.
Hence, they conclude, vacancy durations should be interpreted as selection periods.
There are differences in the intensity of search for employees, which firms
conduct by the skill requirement of the vacancy. Van Ours and Ridder (1993)
report that the mean selection period increases with the required level of education
and experience. Moreover, Barron, Berger, and Black (1997) find that employers
search more when hiring workers with more education and prior experience and
hiring for jobs with higher training requirements. They show that as the education
requirement of the vacancy increases, the number of interviews per offer and number
of applicants per offer goes up (extensive search) as well as the number of hours per
interview and per applicant (intensive search). Barron and Bishop (1987) report
that total time spent on hiring is longer for high skill occupations in comparison to
low skill occupations.
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There is also evidence on search for high skill workers being more effective.
Bagger and Henningsen (2008) use Danish and Norwegian data and look at the job
ending hazard rates by skill. Bagger and Henningsen find that for all skill levels the
likelihood of a job ending decreases with tenure6. At low levels of tenure, low skill
workers are more likely to separate from their jobs, and the difference diminishes as
the tenure increases. The difference in levels of the hazards indicate that high skill
hires are more likely to be good matches.
Hiring policies are used to answer some other facts regarding labor markets.
Pries and Rogerson (2005) analyze differences in labor and job turnovers between
the US and Europe. The differences in labor market policies of these economies
generate differences in hiring policies of firms. Tasci (2006) looks at firms’ hiring
policies over the business cycle, and proposes changes in hiring behavior over the
cycle as another mechanism to increase the response of the key aggregate labor
market variables to productivity shocks.
1.3 Model
This section introduces the model used to answer the question of interest.
The economy is inhabited by workers with two skill types; high skill and low skill
workers. The skill distribution is exogenous and skill type of a worker is observable.
There is also a continuum of firms with heterogenous jobs. Upon entering the
market, firms choose the type of job they want to have. A firm can employ at
6It is well documented that job separations have negative hazards with tenure. See, for example,
Farber (1999).
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most one worker. Firms and workers that search for an employment relationship
are brought together via a matching function. I assume no interaction between high
and low skill sectors, i.e., they are segregated.7 Having no interaction between skill
groups allows me to solve for the equilibrium for each skill group separately. In
consequence, the model explained below applies to each of the skill groups.
There is a continuum of homogenous workers, with total mass equal to one.
There is also a continuum of ex-ante identical firms. All agents are risk neutral, and
they discount future at rate β. A worker can be either unemployed or employed.
When unemployed, workers consume unemployment benefits b.
The production unit in the economy is a firm-worker pair. The pair produces
y = yi amount of output, where i is the quality of the match. yi takes on the value
yg(yb) if the match is good (bad) quality8, where yg > yb. I assume that the amount
of bad quality output is the same across sectors (ybhs = y
b
ls) while good quality output
in the high skill sector is higher than the good quality output in the low skill sector
(yghs > y
g
ls). This is the only exogenous difference between skill groups. Wages are
outcomes of Nash Bargaining, and µ is the worker’s bargaining power.
Production units that are active (i.e. that produced in the current period)
7Although there is empirical evidence in favor of interaction between labor markets, this sim-
plifying assumption allows me to focus on the interaction between the unemployment rate and
hiring policies of firms. Interactions across labor markets can take on many forms, affecting the
unemployment rate disparity between sectors in different directions. One commonly modeled inter-
action across skill groups is that high skill workers can look for both high and low skill jobs while
unemployed and can continue to search for high skill jobs if they exit from unemployment into a low
skill job. Granting such interaction will affect the unemployment rate of high skill workers through
affecting both their probability of finding a job and separating from a job in this model. Since this
paper focuses on the causes of the job separation disparity between skill groups, which is the main
factor of the unemployment rate gap, abstracting away from such interaction is plausible.
8Observe that the quality of the match is not contingent on skill per se.
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are subject to an exogenous destruction at rate δ, which is the same across sectors.
Bagger and Henningsen (2008) estimate the monthly job hazard function for different
education groups using data on Danish and Norwegian workers. At low levels of
tenure, less educated workers have higher hazard rates. However, the difference
closes after five years of tenure. Based on this evidence, it is plausible to assume
the same exogenous destruction rate across groups.
Unemployment stems from frictions in the labor markets. These frictions
are modeled via a matching function. The matching function provides a mapping
between the number of vacancies (v) and the unemployed (u) and the number of
total matches across firms and worker. Thus, it determines the matching probabil-
ities of firms and workers with each other endogenously9. The matching function,
M , is constant returns to scale. Consequently, it only depends on the vacancy-
unemployment ratio v/u = θ , which is called the market tightness. A worker meets
with a firm with probability f(θ) = M/u, and a vacant firm meets with a worker
with probability q(θ) = M/v. The matching function also satisfies the following
boundary conditions: f → 0 and q → 1 as θ → 0, and f → 1 and q → 0 as θ →∞.
Moreover, the probability that a worker meets with a vacancy, f , is an increasing
function of θ while the probability of firms meeting with workers, q, decreases with
θ, i.e., f ′(θ) > 0 and q′(θ) < 0.
The quality of a match is ex-ante uncertain. The true quality of the match
9The model does not have on-the-job search. Thus, all separations in the model result in unem-
ployment. CPS data reveal that both high and low-skill workers experience job-to-job transitions.
However, low-skill workers have substantially higher job separation rates even after accounting for
job-to-job transitions. Hence, abstracting away from on the job search yields simplification without
distorting the validity of the hypothesis of the model.
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is revealed after the first period of production. Hence, a worker-firm pair does not
know the quality of the match unless they produce. However, parties draw the
probability of being in a good quality match, pi, when they meet. After observing
pi, the worker and the firm decide whether to form the match. A higher value of pi
means that it is more likely that the match is good quality.
I model the employee selection procedure as a technology that randomly
delivers a value of pi to the firm-worker pair when they first match. pi can be drawn
from either a costless distribution Γ, or from a more effective distribution Ω, which
comes at a cost (κ). The more effective the technology is, the more likely it is
that the technology delivers higher values of pi, i.e. Ω first order stochastically
dominates Γ. More formally, Ω(pi) ≤ Γ(pi) ∀ pi. One can think of more effective
employee selection procedures as firms using more effective recruitment channels
(i.e. advertising the job opening more extensively and intensively), better employee
assessment, etc. that will result in a better quality match between firm and worker
as opposed to the quality of a match had the firm not used the more effective
technology. Another way of thinking of the more effective selection is as if firms
sample from the same distribution multiple times and choose the highest pi level. In
this case the empirical distribution of pi for firms that do multiple draws will first
order stochastically dominate the original distribution.
I assume that yb ≤ b and yg > b. Under this assumption, bad quality matches
are undesirable in equilibrium. Firm and worker pairs terminate such matches. If all
the separations in this economy were to be exogenous, then the job separation rates
in the equilibrium would be the same across skill groups. However, undesirability
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of bad quality matches generates endogenous separations, which is the source of the
difference in job separation rates across sectors.
1.3.1 Timing of Events
• Each period begins with a number of unemployed workers; a number of worker-
firm matches with known quality; and a number of worker-firm pairs that met
in the previous period the first time and observed their pi.
• All parties decide whether to produce or to detach.
• All workers that do not produce in the current period consume unemployment
benefits.
• Worker-firm pairs that have decided to stay attached produce, and workers
consume their wages.
• All the matches with unknown quality learn the match quality (Observe that
separation decisions will be made at the beginning of the next period).
• Vacant firms decide whether to post a vacancy or not.
• The vacant firms choose a selection technology to use.
• Job markets open; unemployed workers and vacant firms meet.
• Firm-worker pairs that met learn the probability that their match will be good
quality. They will decide at the beginning of next period whether to form the
match or not.
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• Job markets close.
• Exogenous destructions occur; δ fraction of worker-firm pairs that produced
in the current period are destroyed.
• New period begins.
1.3.2 Bellman Equations
Let λ be the probability that firms choose Ω as their employee selection
technology. Moreover, let U(λ) be the value of unemployment to a worker, and
W (pi, λ) be the value of being in a match with a firm to a worker where pi is the
probability that the match is good quality.
U(λ) = b+ β(1− f(θ))U(λ) + βf(θ)
{
λ
∫ 1
0
W (pi, λ)dΩ + (1− λ)
∫ 1
0
W (pi, λ)dΓ
}
(1.1)
If a worker is unemployed, she gets the unemployment benefit, b. The worker
does not meet with any firms, thus continuing to get the value of being unemployed,
with probability 1− f(θ). The worker meets with a firm with probability f(θ), and
gets an expected value from being in a match with a firm. Note that the expected
value the worker gets from being in a match with the firm depends on the selection
technology the firm has chosen.
W (pi, λ) = max
{
U(λ), w(pi, λ) + β
[
pi
{
δU(λ) + (1− δ)W (1, λ)}+ (1− pi)U(λ)]}
(1.2)
If a worker is in a match with a firm and they have the probability pi of
the match being good quality, the worker decides whether to stay in the match or
separate to unemployment. If she stays in the match, the worker gets the wage in
the current period. If the match survives to the next period and it is revealed to be
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good quality, the worker will get the value of being in a good quality match with a
firm, W (1, λ). If the match is revealed to be bad quality, which will happen with
probability 1−pi, the worker will get the value of being in a bad quality match with
a firm, W (0, λ). Recall that, in equilibrium, a match will be terminated if it is bad
quality, therefore W (0, λ) = U(λ).
Let V (λ) be the value of a firm with a vacancy, and J(pi, λ) be the value of
a firm in a match which is good quality with probability pi. The value of a vacancy
is the discounted value of expected profits, net of cost of the vacancy.
V (λ) = −c+ max
{
−κ+ β(1− q(θ))V (λ) + βq(θ) ∫ 10 J(pi, λ)dΩ,
β(1− q(θ))V (λ) + βq(θ) ∫ 10 J(pi, λ)dΓ
}
(1.3)
The first term of equation (1.3) is the per period cost of having a vacancy, c.
The second term of (1.3) has a maximum operator since the firm will decide which
selection procedure to implement. If the firm chooses the more effective distribution,
then it pays the extra cost of using that distribution (κ). Regardless of the choice
of the employee selection procedure, the firm will match with a worker with the
probability q(θ). If the firm matches with a worker, then it will get the expected
value of being in a match which is good quality with probability pi. If the firm does
not match with any worker, which happens with probability 1 − q(θ), then it will
stay vacant and continue to get the value V.
Equation (1.4) formalizes the decision problem of a firm which is in a match
with a worker with the match being good quality with probability pi.
J(pi, λ) = max
{
V (λ), E(y|pi)−w(pi, λ)+βδV (λ)+β(1−δ)(piJ(1, λ)+(1−pi)J(0, λ))}
(1.4)
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where E(y|pi) = piyg + (1− pi)yb. The firm compares the expected discounted value
of profits from producing output with the current worker to the discounted present
value of separating (being vacant). The value the firm gets from producing with a
worker with probability pi of having a good quality match is the sum of the current
period profit, which is the expected value of output produced minus the wage paid
to the worker, and the discounted value of being in a match with the same worker
the subsequent period, if the match survives. Observe that a surviving match is
revealed to be good quality with probability pi. In this case the firm will get the
discounted present value of being in match with a worker with the match quality
being good with probability one, J(1, λ). However, with probability 1−pi the match
quality will be revealed to be bad, and the firm will get the value J(0, λ). With the
assumption that yb ≤ b, firms and workers will separate in equilibrium if the match
is bad quality, i.e. J(0, λ) = V (λ).
Although an equilibrium object, λ appears as an argument in value functions
of agents. This is because, beliefs about λ can potentially affect firms’ decision
whether to adopt the effective technology. The value of lambda affects the value of
unemployment for workers, because it affects the wages at other firms. Thus, a firm
needs to take into account what the λ is, and which technology it uses for given λ
(wages). This point is discussed in more detail in section 3.2.
Wages are determined according to a Nash bargaining rule, where worker’s
bargaining power is µ. The wage rate that solves the bargaining problem is such that
the worker gets a constant (µ) fraction of the net value generated by the worker-firm
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union10.
Nash assumption guarantees the unanimity of the separation or match for-
mation decision. That is because parties bargain over the net surplus of forming
the production unit, and if the surplus is positive (negative) they decide to form the
match (separate). Hence there is no inconsistency across parties in decision making.
1.3.3 Worker Flow Across Employment States
Let ut, e
g
t , and e
n
t be the unemployment rate, good quality employment, and
unknown quality employment at period t, respectively. Let X(pi) = 1(0) be the
decision of a worker-firm pair who observe pi (not) to form the match. Moreover,
let E(pi|X(pi) = 1) denote the expected value of the match being good quality,
conditional on the match being formed. Recall that λ is the probability that Ω in
the equilibrium selection technology.
The number of good quality matches in the subsequent period is the sum
of the good quality matches of the current period and the current period unknown
quality matches which are revealed to be good quality in the subsequent period that
survive exogenous destruction.
egt+1 = (1− δ)egt + ent (1− δ)Eλ(pi|Xpi = 1)
Since all matches reveal their quality after the first period of production, the number
10Let the second argument of the maximization operation in 1.2 (1.4) equation be W˜ (pi, λ)
(J˜(pi, λ)). Then, the wage is such that
W˜ (pi, λ)− U(λ) = µ
{
W˜ (pi, λ)− U(λ) + J˜(pi, λ)− V (λ)
}
(1.5)
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of unknown quality matches in any period are the same as the number of matches
formed in that period.
ent+1 = utftEλ(Xpi)
The number of the unemployed workers in the subsequent period is the sum
of the unemployed in the current period who did not meet with a firm, the current
period unemployed who met with a firm but drew a low pi (thus stayed unemployed),
the current period employed who were hit by an exogenous destruction shock, and
the current period employed with unknown match quality who learned their match
was of bad quality.
ut+1 = ut(1− ftEλ(Xpi)) + δ(egt + ent ) + ent (1− δ)
(
1− Eλ(pi|Xpi = 1)
)
1.4 Equilibrium
The steady state equilibrium, for each of the sectors, is a list {eg, en, v, u, λ, pi∗, w(pi, λ), X(pi),
J(pi, λ), V (λ),W (pi, λ), U(λ)} such that
• {J(pi, λ), V (λ),W (pi, λ), U(λ)} satisfy equations 1.4, 1.3, 1.2, and 1.1.
• V (λ) = 0.
• w(pi, λ) is the solution to the Nash bargaining, i.e., satisfies equation 1.5.
• X(pi) = 1 iff
w(pi, λ) + βδU(λ) + β(1− δ)(piW (1, λ) + (1− pi)W (0, λ))− U(λ) ≥ 0
E(y|pi)− w(pi, λ) + βδV (λ) + β(1− δ)(piJ(1, λ) + (1− pi)J(0, λ))− V (λ) ≥ 0
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• Selection technology is chosen optimally
λ(λ−) =

1 if −κ+ βq(θ) ∫ 10 J(pi, λ−)dΩ > βq(θ) ∫ 10 J(pi, λ−)dΓ
0 if −κ+ βq(θ) ∫ 10 J(pi, λ−)dΩ < βq(θ) ∫ 10 J(pi, λ−)dΓ
∈ [0, 1] if −κ+ βq(θ) ∫ 10 J(pi, λ−)dΩ = βq(θ) ∫ 10 J(pi, λ−)dΓ
where λ− is the decision rule for the rest of the firms.
• λ is consistent, i.e., λ(λ−) = λ−
• The reservation probability pi∗ satisfies
E(y|pi∗)− w(pi∗, λ) + βδV (λ) + β(1− δ)(pi∗J(1, λ) + (1− pi∗)J(0, λ)) = V (λ)
w(pi∗, λ) + βδU(λ) + β(1− δ)(pi∗W (1, λ) + (1− pi∗)W (0, λ)) = U(λ)
• The flows among employment and unemployment states are constant
u = 1− eg − en
δeg = en(1− δ)Eλ(pi|X)
en = ufEλ(Xpi)11
The existence of equilibrium is discussed in the appendix. Following sub-
sections talk about employee selection technology in equilibrium, and the model’s
implications for labor market outcomes.
11There is also a flow equation that equates flows out of unemployment to flows into unemploy-
ment.
ufEλ(Xpi) = δe
g + en
[
δ + (1− δ)(1− Eλ(pi|X))]
Observe that given the two other flow equations, this equation is redundant.
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1.4.1 Employee Selection in the Equilibrium
Firms choose the more effective selection technology if
βq(θλ)
[ ∫ 1
pi∗λ
J(piλ)dΩ−
∫ 1
pi∗λ
J(piλ)dΓ
]
> κ
One can rewrite expected profits of firm from having an employment relationship as∫ 1
pi∗λ
J(piλ)d· = (1− µ) (yg − yb)1− β(1− δ)(1− pi∗λ)
∫ 1
pi∗λ
[pi − pi∗λ]d·
This equation uses the fact that what firm gets is a constant fraction of net match
surplus, and match surplus depends on the difference between good and bad qual-
ity outputs as well as the reservation probability. This equation is derived in the
appendix for existence of equilibrium.
Substituting for expected profits of firm from having an employment rela-
tionship into the equation for selection technology yields
βq(θλ)(1− µ)(yg − yb)
1− β(1− δ)(1− pi∗λ)
[ ∫ 1
pi∗λ
[pi − pi∗λ]dΩ−
∫ 1
pi∗λ
[pi − pi∗λ]dΓ
]
> κ (1.6)
Observe that, firms are more likely to select Ω if, everything else being the
same, yg − yb is higher. Since high skill firms have a higher uncertainty associated
with the match quality, they are more likely to use the effective employee selec-
tion technology in equilibrium. Note that this is an ex-ante condition, it does not
guarantee that high skill firms use that technology.
How the equation above reacts to changes in λ determines whether there can
be multiple equilibria. Suppose the left hand side of the equation (1.6) is decreasing
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Figure 1.4: Illustration of Equation (1.6)
in λ. If there are many (few) firms using the effective selection technique (i.e., λ is
high [low]), then using the same technique, as opposed to the costless technique, is
less (more) profitable. In other words, firms’ actions are strategic substitutes. In
this case the equilibrium is unique.
However, if left hand side of equation (1.6) increases in λ, then firms’ actions
are strategic compliments and it is possible to have multiple equilibria. Note that,
if a higher fraction of firms use the effective selection technology, then using the
effective technology, as opposed to the costless technology, yields higher profits.
Why does this happen? How the deviation condition (equation (1.6)) re-
sponds to changes in λ, depends on how θ changes with λ.12 Using effective selection
12Although qualitatively ambiguous, numerical exercises show that the response of left hand side
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technology increases firms profits, condition that they produce. However, how the
expected profits change depends how θ changes. If θ increases (decreases) with λ,
then, when there are many firms using effective technology, expected profits go down
(up). This happens because now a firm is less (more) likely to find a worker to realize
the profits13. Whether market tightness increases or decreases with λ depends on
the primitive parameters. This is because, for given market tightness, as the fraction
of the firms using the effective selection technology increases, the reservation prob-
abilities go up as workers get a higher probability of forming good quality matches
elsewhere. That increases expected profits from having an employment relationship,
however whether this increase is high enough to cover the higher expected cost of
selection is ambiguous. Thus how market tightness reacts is ambiguous.
Quantitative analysis reveals that market tightness, for these specific param-
eter values, decreases with λ. Thus, as will be discussed later, there is possibility of
multiple equilibria.
1.4.2 Model Implications for Labor Market Outcomes
An unemployed worker’s probability of finding a job, which I denote by p,
has two components. The first component is the probability that the worker matches
with a firm, f(θ). This probability is endogenously determined in the model, and it
is a function of the equilibrium vacancy unemployment ratio. The second component
follows the response of θ.
13Change in θ also affects surpluses through affecting workers’ outside option. If, for instance,
increase in λ decreases θ and if many firms choose effective technology, then market tightness is
low, so is the workers’ outside option. That allows the firm have enough profits from the match to
cover the cost of effective technology. Thus, the firm is more likely to choose the effective selection
technology.
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is the expected probability of a worker-firm pair drawing a high enough probability
of a match being good quality so that the parties decide to form the production unit.
The reservation probability, together with the selection technology a firm chooses,
determines the acceptance probability. Then, the job finding probability of a worker
is
p = f(θ)
(
1− λΩ(pi∗)− (1− λ)Γ(pi∗))
Note that the difference between the job finding probabilities of high and low
skill workers can come from the difference in market tightness, the difference in the
selection technologies implemented, or the difference in the reservation probabilities.
Similarly, the vacancy filling probability, denoted by h, is determined by
market tightness, which determines the probability that the vacancy meets with a
worker, and the acceptance probability of a match. Formally:
h = q(θ)
(
1− λΩ(pi∗)− (1− λ)Γ(pi∗))
The other important moment is total job separation rate. Total separation
rate is determined by the exogenous and endogenous separations.
s(en + eg) = (en + eg)δ + en(1− δ)(1− Eλ(pi|Xpi = 1))
The first term in equation above is the exogenous separations, which affects all of the
matches. Endogenous separation, on the other hand, occurs only for matches with
unknown match quality which have survived the exogenous destruction. Among
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those, the ones that are revealed to be bad quality get destroyed. Using the rela-
tionship between good (or known) quality matches and unknown quality matches,
which is given via the flow equation in definition of equilibrium, I derive that
en
en + eg
=
δ
δ + (1− δ)Eλ(pi|Xpi = 1)
Substituting for e
n
en+eg in equation for separations, we get
s =
δ
δ + (1− δ)Eλ(pi|Xpi = 1) (1.7)
Observe that the separation rate is the same as the fraction of employees
that have unknown quality matches. This is because, every period, workers with
unknown quality matches either separate to unemployment, or they replace workers
with good quality matches that separated to unemployment. The total number
of job separations depends on the exogenous destruction rate and the conditional
expected value of the match being good quality.
Since the exogenous destruction rate δ is the same across sectors, the only
source of a discrepancy between total job separation rates across skill groups is
the differences in the conditional expected value of a match being good quality.
The higher the Eλ(pi|Xpi = 1), the lower the total separations. Observe that, the
assumption that Ω first order stochastically dominates Γ does not guarantee a higher
separation rates, since separation rate also depends on an endogenous value pi∗.
After some algebra on the equilibrium flow equations, one can show that the
unemployment rate is:
u =
δ
δ + p
(
δ + Eλ(pi|X(pi) = 1)(1− δ)
)
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Substituting δ from equation (1.7) and rearranging terms gives the familiar equation
of
u =
s
s+ p
The unemployment rate depends on the probability of workers finding a job
and the probability of them separating from their jobs to unemployment. To see
whether the proposed model can generate labor market outcomes for high and low-
skill workers that are consistent with the data, I utilize the following quantitative
exercise.
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
I assign values to the parameters of the model to match some facts of the U.S.
labor markets. The period length of the model is one month. I set β = 0.9967, to
get an annual interest rate of 4 %. The bargaining power of the workers is generally
set to a number between 0.3 and 0.5 in the literature14. This number corresponds to
the empirical measures of match elasticity of unemployment15. I set the bargaining
power of the workers in Nash bargaining to 0.36, a value commonly used in the
literature.
Observe that multiplying c, κ, yg, yb, and b by the same number does not
change the solution to the equation system. Thus, I normalize b in both sectors to
1. I also set yb = b. This is sufficient for bad quality matches to be terminated in
14See Petrangola and Pissarides (2001) for an excellent literature survey.
15Bargaining power is set to be the same as match elasticity of unemployment to get efficient
outcomes in equilibrium (Hosios Condition).
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the equilibrium. Moreover, this assumption implies that only the difference between
high and low quality output matters for the equilibrium.
I assume the matching function to be M(u, v) =
uv
(uα + vα)1/α
. This func-
tional form naturally bounds workers’ and firms’ matching probabilities to be in
the unit interval. Employee selection distributions are assumed to be Beta distri-
butions. Although there is not direct evidence on the distributional form of the
selection technologies, I choose the Beta distribution because it has support in the
unit interval. Moreover, I assume the first parameter of both Beta distributions to
be 1 16.
Table 1.2: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Parameter Value
β 0.996 4% interest cls = chs 2.7 Match
b 1 Normalization κ 6.66 Match
yb b Restriction y
g
ls 2.11 Match
µ 0.36 Petrongolo et al. (2000) yghs 3.63 Match
α 0.98 Match βΓ 3.8 Match
δ 0.0039 Match βΩ 0.67 Match
Remaining parameters of the model are the exogenous job destruction rate δ,
matching function parameter α, the output a good quality low skill match produces
ygls, the cost of effective selection technology κ, and parameter values of Γ and Ω
distributions. I estimate these parameters so that the distance between the values of
the chosen moments (described below) in the data and the values of these moments
16In this model’s equilibrium pi∗ values will be low. Thus I need distributions with some mass in
the lower tail. I normalized the first, not the second, parameter of the Beta distribution, because
setting the second parameter of the Beta distribution to 1 gives low cumulative densities for low
values of pi.
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in the model is minimized.
I use the following data moments. Davis et al. (1996) report that 23 percent
of all annual job destruction is due to plant shutdowns in the manufacturing industry.
I target 23 percent of all separations being exogenous in the low skill sector in the
steady state. The literature widely assumes the match elasticity of unemployment
to be 36 percent (Shimer 2005). I match the unemployment rate of 0.05 and job
finding probability of 0.323 for low skill workers. To have the unemployment rate of
0.05 and the job separation rate of 0.017 requires a job finding probability of 0.323
in this model. This is because in the model the relationship between unemployment
rate and the job finding probability is
s
s+ p
17. I also target the value of .294 for
the steady state job finding probability of high skill workers. I match per worker
output produced to be 79 percent higher in high-skill jobs. Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001) look at value added in high and low skill sectors and report a difference of
79 percent between the sectors. The expected value of wages of high skill workers
are 90 percent higher, and the highest wage low skill workers can earn is 25 percent
higher than the lowest wage in the steady state. Heathcote et al. (2008) report the
college premium to be around 90 percent. Topel and Ward (1992) report that the
cumulative change in wages over the first 10 years of work history that is associated
with job change is around 33 percent. I set the ratio of the highest wage to the
lowest in the low skill sector to be 25 percent, the number that is also used by Pries
and Rogerson (2005).
17Due to fluctuations over the sample period I have, the correlation between actual unemploy-
ment rate and steady state unemployment rate implied by matching model (
s
s+ p
), is not 1.
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Table 1.3: Targeted Moments
Moment Value Source
low-skill job finding probability 0.323 Monthly average, 76-07
low-skill unemployment rate 0.0.05 Monthly average, 76-07
high-skill job finding probability 0.294 Monthly average, 76-07
Output difference across skill 1.79 Acemoglu et al (2001)
Expected wage gap across skill 1.9 Heatchote et al (2008)
Highest to lowest wage ratio; low skill 1.25 Topel et al (2002)
Fraction of annual job destruction due to plant shutdowns .23 Davis et al. (1996)
Match elasticity of Unemployment .36 Petrangolo et al(2000)
Observe that I have a system of eight equations with eight unknowns. The
parameter values will be the minimizers of the distance between the data moments
and their counterparts in the model. Recall that, if firms’ actions are strategic
complements, then there is a possibility of multiple equilibria. In computational
exercise, I find the values of pi∗ and θ for λ = 1 and λ = 0 and check whether the
firms want to deviate from the distribution all other firms are assumed to use. If
deviations are not profitable for either λ values, i.e., if there are multiple equilibria,
then I choose the equilibrium in which λ = 1. I do not search over an interior solution
for λ in this case, since the equilibrium for such λ is not stable. The economy reaches
to this λ value only if it starts there. I choose the λ = 1 equilibrium in computations
because i) multiplicity happens only for skilled firms, and ii) this is the equilibrium
we see in data.
1.5.1 Results
The estimated parameter values are reported in Table 1.2 along with the
other parameter values. The value of good quality output for high skill workers is
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more than 70 percent higher than that of low skill workers. The vacancy cost of a
low skill job is higher than the amount of good quality output the job can produce.
Although the vacancy cost of a high skill job is less than the amount of good quality
output, the total cost, vacancy cost and the cost of more effective technology, is more
than twice the good quality output the high skill job can produce. The total cost of a
high skill vacancy is more than 3 times higher than the vacancy cost of low skill jobs.
Although there is not direct evidence on the value of κ, Barron and Bishop (1985)
report that total time spent in recruiting managerial, professional, and technical
occupations is more than twice that of the blue collar and service occupations, and
more than 50 percent higher than the clerical and sales occupations. Taking into
account that the actual cost will be higher than the time cost, since the opportunity
cost of workers who hire for high-skill occupations is expected to be higher as well,
the value of κ is reasonable.
While searching for parameter values, I do not impose the restriction that
the more effective distribution, Ω, should first order stochastically dominate the less
effective selection distribution, Γ. As Figure 3 show, estimated values of Ω and Γ
distributions are such that Ω first order stochastically dominates Γ.
The equilibrium values of various labor market outcomes for high and low
skill workers are displayed in Table 1.4. The model delivers targeted data moments.
The unemployment rate and the job finding probability of low skill workers are the
same as in the data. Observe that the model has the following relationship between
the unemployment rate and job finding and job separation probabilities: u =
s
s+ p
.
Thus, the job separation rate of low-skill workers, although not directly targeted, is
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Figure 1.5: CDF Values of Employee Selection Distributions
the same as in the data.
For high skill workers, the model successfully delivers a job separation rate
that is as low as it is in the data. The model also replicates the discrepancy between
high and low skill unemployment rates. Observe that neither the unemployment rate
nor the job separation rate of high skill workers is targeted. Moreover, the difference
in job separation rates across skill groups is due to the more effective selection
procedure high skill firms employ. The market tightness skill groups experience is
0.56 and 0.45 for low and high skill workers, respectively. Although there is no data
on market tightness of skill groups, these numbers imply an overall market tightness
in between these two values. Market tightness for the US since 2001 is on average
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0.4618.
Table 1.4: Results
High Skill Low Skill
Data Model Data Model
unemployment rate 0.02 0.021 0.05 0.05+
job finding probability 0.294 0.294+ 0.323 0.323+
job separation probability 0.006 0.0063 0.017 0.017
vacancy filling probability - 0.65 - 0.58
θ - 0.45 - 0.56
pi∗ - 0.059 - 0.024
E(pi|pi∗) - 0.63 - 0.23
w(1)/w(pi∗) - 1.35 1.25 1.25+
w(1) - 3.46 - 1.94
w(pi∗) - 2.57 - 1.55
+: Targeted moments.
Although there is no data for vacancy duration by skill for the US, Danish
data suggest that (Van Ours and Ridder (1993)) high skill vacancies have higher
durations. The model, however, predicts a lower duration for high skill vacancies,
compared to low skill vacancies. This is not because high skill workers do not spend
more time in recruitment, it is because the market tightness in high skill sector
is low. As a result of low market tightness (low numbers of vacancies), high skill
vacancies fill up more quickly than low skill vacancies. The market tightness high
skill firms face is low because cost of opening a vacancy (including the cost of the
selection technology) is too high.
The results are robust to different plausible values of µ. Re-estimating the
model parameters with µ = 0.4, and µ = 0.5 delivers targeted moments and changes
18The data can be found at http://www.bls.gov/jlt/
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Table 1.5: A Counterfactual Exercise
Experiment
High Skill Data Model Only Γ Only Ω
unemployment rate 0.02 0.021 0.031 0.011
job finding probability 0.294 0.294 0.508 0.567
job separation probability 0.006 0.0063 0.0162 0.0061
vacancy filling probability - 0.65 0.349 0.347
θ - 0.45 1.452 1.634
pi∗ - 0.059 0.037 0.109
CDF value at pi∗ - 0.04 0.133 0.074
E(pi|pi∗) - 0.63 0.237 0.642
w(1)/w(pi∗) - 1.35 1.373 1.313
Low Skill
unemployment rate 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.0162
job finding probability 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.375
job separation probability 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.0062
vacancy filling probability - 0.58 0.58 0.563
θ - 0.56 0.56 0.665
pi∗ - 0.024 0.024 0.074
CDF value at pi∗ - 0.088 0.088 0.05
E(pi|pi∗) - 0.23 0.23 0.628
w(1)/w(pi∗) - 1.25 1.25 1.219
other moments of interest slightly. For µ = 0.4, the model predicts a job separation
probability and an unemployment rate of 0.0059 and 0.0196 for high skill workers,
respectively. The job separation rate and the unemployment rate of high skill work-
ers are predicted to be 0.0053 and 0.0177, respectively, for µ = 0.5. The results
do not change if I normalize the first parameter of the distributions to 1.1 or 1.2,
instead of 1.
To clarify the effects of employee selection technology, I carry out the follow-
ing exercises. In the first exercise, I let firms use only the less effective selection tech-
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nology, Γ. In this case, the only difference between skill groups in their equilibrium
outcomes is due to productivity differences. The third column of Table 1.5 presents
the results of the model for parameter values given in Table 2. The unemployment
rate of low skill workers is 60 percent higher than the high skill unemployment rate.
Although the difference in unemployment rates is high, it is not as high as it is in
the data. Moreover, the reason for the unemployment rate discrepancy is mainly
the difference in job finding probabilities between skill groups. High skill workers
experience a high job finding probability because their labor market is too tight.
Higher market tightness in the high skill sector generates a longer vacancy filling
duration for high skill firms, compared to low skill firms. This is because opening
a vacancy costs the same for all firms, and high skill jobs are expected to be more
productive.
The last column of Table 1.5 shows the equilibrium of the model if Ω were
the only selection distribution that was available without any cost. The difference
between high and low skill unemployment rates is close to 50 percent. Like the
previous case, the difference in unemployment rates is due to the difference in job
finding probabilities. The reason that columns two and four are not the same for high
skill workers is that, in the case where Ω is the only selection technology (column
four), there is no cost (κ) for using Ω. Observe that it is the high cost of using
effective selection technology that draws market tightness for high skill firms down.
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a new explanation for the unemployment rate disparity
between skill groups. It is well documented that high skill workers have lower
unemployment rates. Data also show that the reason for the lower unemployment
rate of high skill workers is their lower probability of job separation. High skill
workers are less likely to separate from their jobs because they are selected more
effectively. Firms do more intensive and extensive employee search when hiring for
high skill vacancies in the data.
This paper uses a matching model with uncertainty about match quality and
with two employee selection technologies that differ in their cost and effectiveness.
In the equilibrium, high skill firms, which are the firms with higher productivity,
self-select themselves into using more effective technology. As a result of the choice
of more effective technology, a higher fraction of high skill firms end up with good
quality matches, thus a lower fraction experience endogenous match termination.
Consequently, high skill workers have an unemployment rate in equilibrium that is
as low as the data, compared to low skill workers, as they have substantially low
job separation rates.
There is more work that needs to be done to explore skill bias in job sepa-
ration rates. This paper focuses on the role of employee selection on job separation
rates. In this paper, the driving force for high skill firms employing more effective
technology is the productivity difference between high and low quality matches. An-
other possible reason is that learning about the match quality is slower for high skill
jobs. This will not only directly contribute to the lower job separation of high skill,
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but also affect the employee selection procedures firms use. Whether the difference
in productivity or in the speed of learning about the match quality is more influential
on the choice of employee selection technologies of firms is an open question.
The model abstracts from interaction across skill groups. For future work, it
will be interesting to explore the effects of interactions across markets on employee
selection technologies of firms. There are also other possible contributors to the
bias, such as firm specific training, that should be explored.
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Chapter 2
Interaction Between Labor Market Outcomes through
Matching Markets
2.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes effects of job competition between different skill groups
on their labor market outcomes. Skill groups interact with each other through
different channels. They are hired by the same firms, products they produce may
be substitutes, and they may look for the same type of jobs. Thus, labor market
outcomes of these skill groups are interrelated. Understanding the importance and
effects of these channels will guide us in developing models and understanding the
overall labor markets.
Job competition occurs if skilled workers compete with unskilled workers for
unskilled jobs. Job competition is one of the possible explanations for the higher
unemployment rate of unskilled workers compared to skilled workers. To my knowl-
edge, there are no other papers that look specifically at effects of job competition.
Moreno-Galbis and Sneessens (2007), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Stadler and
Wapler (2004), and Pierrard and Sneessens (2003) study skill biased technological
change in models with job competition.
There are limited studies that look at job competition empirically. Van Ours
and Ridder (1995) use Dutch labor market data from the 1980s. They find that job
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competition takes place among higher educated workers.
Job competition has a testable implication: Participation of skilled work-
ers at unskilled job search should create thinner markets on the unskilled workers’
side, resulting in a decrease in their job finding probability. Hence, changes in
skilled unemployment rate should negatively affect the probability of employment
for unskilled workers. Observe that unskilled unemployment rate will affect the
employment probability of a skilled worker as well. A probit regression of the prob-
ability of being employed on skilled and unskilled unemployment rates should reflect
that interaction.
I use the Current Population Survey data to run the probit regression. The
data and the regression are discussed in more detail in the following section. The
regression shows that the employment probability of both skilled and unskilled work-
ers is affected by the unemployment rate of the other skill group. Although that
regression is silent about the source of interaction, it proves that an interaction
exists, which makes this paper worth pursuing.
The purpose of this paper is to study effects of job competition on labor
market outcomes of skilled and unskilled workers systematically. I use a labor
matching model with two skill groups. Unskilled workers can only do unskilled
jobs, whereas skilled workers can work at any type of job. Matching markets are
segregated by the skill requirements of jobs. Consequently, workers can direct their
search by the skill type of the job (job search is not directed within skill). Moreover,
job markets operate sequentially, with the skilled job market operating first. This
timing assumption allows skilled workers to participate in unskilled search if they
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cannot find a skilled job. They do not need to choose between a skilled and an
unskilled job.1 The only source of interaction between groups is through matching
markets. The decision of skilled workers to search for unskilled jobs is endogenous
to the model. Skilled workers who are employed at unskilled jobs can search on the
job.
Direct effects of job competition are reducing skilled unemployment rate
(since they have bigger market) and increasing the unskilled unemployment rate
(since they face higher competition). Since skilled workers are expected to have
higher outside options, their wages at skilled jobs is expected to go up. Similarly,
unskilled wages are expected to go down. However the number of vacancies responds
to job competition. Unskilled firms have incentives to open more vacancies since
filling a vacancy is easier in the presence of job competition. Thus how unskilled
unemployment and wages are affected by job competition depends on which effect
dominates. Moreover, since skilled workers search on the job while employed at
unskilled jobs, one would expect the vacancy filling rate for skilled vacancies to be
not affected by job competition. It will only affect skilled workers’ outside option,
thus wages. However, it is not obvious whether this is a strong effect. The results
for reasonable parameter values show that job competition does reduce the average
unemployment rate. It reduces the skilled unemployment rate more, generating an
increase in unemployment rate inequality. However, employment rate at skilled jobs
is unaffected.
1There is no consensus in the literature in modeling matching within a heterogeneous agents
framework.
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The following section of the paper provides evidence on interaction between
labor market outcomes of skill groups. Section 2 describes the model. Computing
the equilibrium of the model and calibration of parameter values are discussed in
section 3. The next section documents results and section 5 concludes..
2.2 Interaction Between Labor Markets
If there is job competition between different skill groups, then their un-
employment rates would reflect such information. Interaction across skill groups
through matching markets suggests that skilled workers prefer employment at an
unskilled job to staying unemployed. Participation of skilled workers in unskilled
job markets will create thinner markets on the unskilled workers’ side. Thus, an
increase in skilled unemployment rate will reduce the job finding probability for un-
skilled workers, and increase their unemployment rate as well. Equivalently, changes
in skilled unemployment rate should negatively affect the probability of employment
of unskilled workers. Observe that unskilled unemployment rate will affect the prob-
ability of employment of skilled workers as well.
To substantiate this relationship, I run a probit regression in order to cal-
culate the effects of skilled and unskilled unemployment rates on the employment
probability of workers of a particular skill group. Let yi be equal to one if the worker
i of a specific skill group is employed, and zero if she is not. Then, we can express
the probability of observing yi = 1 as a function of individual characteristics and
some labor market indicators.
P (yi = 1|x) = Φ(xη), (2.1)
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where x is 1×K, η is K×1, and the first element of x is unity. The vector x
contains personal characteristics, skilled and unskilled unemployment rates for the
metropolitan statistical area in which the person lives, and some control variables
for the area, month and year.
I use the monthly CPS data from January 1996 to December 2006 to estimate
the model above. I use the working age population that is not self employed, not in
the armed forces, and lives in one of the laargest twelve consolidated metropolitan
statistical areas (CMSA). I restrict the sample to the biggest metropolitan areas
because in smaller CMSAs, there are too few skilled unemployed workers. Individ-
ual characteristics are age, gender, marital status, experience, squares of age and
experience, race, and citizenship status.2
Labor market variables are skilled and unskilled unemployment rates. I
calculate unemployment rates for each month of the sample period for each CMSA.3.
Unemployment rates vary by geography and time.
The first four columns of Table ?? report the marginal effects of skilled
and unskilled unemployment rates on the probability of an unskilled worker being
employed, under different specifications. First of all, unemployment rates of both
skilled and unskilled workers negatively affect the probability of an unskilled worker
being employed. These effects are significant for all model specifications. Changes
in the unskilled unemployment rate affects the probability of an unskilled worker
2CPS do not have direct data on work experience. I constructed the series by subtracting years
of education plus 6 from the age.
3This is because smaller metropolitan areas will have smaller sample sizes.
42
being employed more. These results hold true if we control for only geography, only
seasonal changes, both geography and seasonal changes, and geography, seasonal,
and year to year changes.
The probability of a skilled worker being employed is also affected by her
own skill group’s unemployment rate. The effect of unskilled unemployment rate on
this probability is relatively much smaller.
One should interpret these results with caution, since they only suggest the
presence of interaction. If skilled and unskilled workers were complements in the
production process, then we would have seen the same effect of unemployment rates
on the probability of employment.
2.3 Model
I use a search model of unemployment with heterogenous agents and firms
to investigate the effects of job matching on labor market outcomes. There are two
types of agents: skilled (s) and unskilled (u). Worker population is normalized to
1. Skilled workers form a fraction p of the population. All agents have linear utility
and maximize expected earnings.
There are two types of firms: skilled and unskilled. Each firm has one
job. Skilled jobs can only be done by skilled workers while unskilled jobs can be
filled by workers of any skill type. Each firm chooses the skill type of the job and
employs at most 1 worker. A filled job produces output yi(k) where i ∈ {s, u} and
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Without loss of generality, assume yi(1) < yi(2) < ... < yi(n).
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yi(k) follows a Markov process. Let Πi be the transition matrix for the
Markov process of firms in sector i. ys(·) and yu(·) are independent processes.
Moreover, let z = {yu(·), ys(·)} be the state of the economy.
The cost of posting a vacancy is ci. A match survives to the next period
with probability δi. Firms and workers have the same discount rate β.
A worker can be employed or unemployed. All workers earn wage while
employed and are entitled to unemployment income while unemployed. Wage is
determined through Nash bargaining. Skilled workers are free to choose whether
to look for unskilled jobs. Skilled workers who work for unskilled firms can search
for a skilled job while employed, i.e., there is on the job search. Since all jobs are
homogenous within a sector, workers do not get better off by searching for a job
within the same sector. Thus, I assume only skilled workers who are employees of
unskilled jobs search on the job.
2.3.1 Matching Markets
The number of matches between firms and workers is endogenous in the
model and it is determined in matching markets. Firms and workers that meet
start producing in the subsequent period.
Matching markets are differentiated by the skill requirement of firms. Work-
ers can direct their search by the skill type of the firm. Let us assume that these
markets operate sequentially and the skilled job market operates first. After the
skilled job market closes, the unskilled job market opens. Skilled unemployed work-
ers who could not find a skilled job, as well as unskilled unemployed workers, can
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participate in unskilled job search.
The heterogenous matching literature does not have a unanimous way of
modeling matching. For instance, Albreht and Vroman (2002) assume a global
matching market which implies that neither firms nor workers can direct their search
by skill. I choose to have sequential markets because it is a more realistic way of mod-
eling job competition, since skilled workers primarily look for skilled jobs. Moreover,
undirected search by skill artificially amplifies interaction. That is because with a
global matching market, skilled firms can meet with unskilled workers, whom they
will not hire, which results in lower incentives for skilled firms to open vacancies.
The meetings are governed by a matching function M(u˜j , vj(z)) in each job
market, where vj is the ratio of vacancies of skill type j to the labor force of type
j, and u˜j is the ratio of the total number of job searchers in market j to the labor
force of skill type j.
There are only skilled firms and workers in the skilled job market. Mar-
ket tightness in the skilled market is the ratio of vacancies to unemployed and on
the job searchers. The probability that a skilled firm meets a skilled worker is
M(u˜s, vs(z))/vs(z), and the probability that a skilled worker meets a skilled firm is
M(u˜s, vs(z))/u˜s. Note that qus(z) = 0, since unskilled workers do not participate
in skilled job search. Let esu be the fraction of skilled labor force that works at
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unskilled jobs. Then,
u˜s = us + esu
θs(z) =
vs(z)
u˜s
qss(z) =
M(u˜s, vs(z))
vs(z)
= q(θs(z))
qus(z) = 0
fss(z) =
M(u˜s, vs(z))
u˜s
= f(θs(z)).
(2.2)
Note that the probability that an unemployed skilled worker finds a skilled
job, fss, is not affected by job competition directly. This is because, due to sequential
job markets assumption, the possibility of search for an unskilled job does not affect
the number of unemployed skilled workers who search for a skilled job, per se.
The only other channel through which the skilled job finding probability will be
affected is through the number of vacancies. However, job competition does not
affect vacancy creation through the vacancy filling rates (or market tightness), per
se. Firms are aware that skilled workers who find an unskilled job will be back in
the market. Thus, job competition does not affect the firms’ probability of finding
a worker. As will be discussed later, the effect of job competition on skilled vacancy
creation occurs through wages.
There can be skilled unemployed workers, in addition to unskilled job searchers,
in the unskilled job market. Let λ(z) be the probability that skilled workers partic-
ipate in unskilled job search. Note that those skilled unemployed who cannot find
a skilled job, (1− fss(z))pus, may participate in unskilled job search. Moreover, let
ψs(z) be the probability that unskilled firms can meet with a skilled worker.
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u˜u(z) = (1− p)uu + λ(z)(1− fss(z))pus
θu(z) =
(1− p)vu(z)
u˜u(z)
quu(z) =
M(u˜u(z), vu(z))
vu(z)
(1− ψs(z)) = q(θu(z))(1− ψs(z))
qsu(z) =
M(u˜u(z), vu(z))
vu(z)
ψs(z) = q(θu(z))ψs(z)
fuu(z) =
M(u˜u(z), vu(z))
u˜u(z)
= f(θu(z))
fus(z) = 0
fsu(z) = λ(z)(1− fss(z))M(u˜u(z), vu(z))
u˜u(z)
= λ(z)(1− fss)f(θu(z))
(2.3)
Job competition affects the probability that a skilled unemployed worker
finds a job since it gives the workers the opportunity to have an unskilled job.
The market tightness in the unskilled job market, which determines the job
finding probability of unskilled workers, is directly affected by job competition. If
skilled workers were not to participate in unskilled job search, there would be more
open positions per unskilled worker. Thus, they would find jobs more easily.
However, job competition gives unskilled firms incentives to open vacancies,
since a higher number of job searchers lets vacancies be filled more quickly. Although
one would expect the latter effect to be weaker than the former, theoretically job
competition need not hurt unskilled workers.
2.3.2 Timing
• A period starts with worker-firm pairs in a meeting, unemployed workers, and
vacancies.
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• Shocks are realized.
• Worker-firm pairs decide whether to produce or search.
• Firm-worker pairs that stay in the match start producing
• Skilled job market opens. Unemployed skilled workers and skilled workers who
hold unskilled jobs search for a skilled job.
• Skilled job market closes. Skilled workers decide whether to participate in
unskilled job search.
• Unskilled job market opens.
• New meetings form.
• Some fraction of jobs are destroyed.
2.3.3 Firms’ Bellman Equations
Let Vj(z) denote the discounted present value of a vacancy to a firm with
skill type j ∈ {s, u}. The vacant firm needs to incur the vacancy cost cj . The
firm meets with a worker with some endogenous probability and decides whether to
produce with that worker or continue to search in the following period. The firm
with skill type j matches with a worker with skill type i with probability qij(z). The
discounted present value of a firm that produces is J·j(z).4
Recall that the vacancy filling probability is a function of market tightness.
Firms need to know the market tightness in order solve their optimization problem.
4First notation of the subscript denotes the worker’s skill type.
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Hence, it is part of the state of the economy for firms. For notational ease, I do not
explicitly write the market tightness as an argument.
Vu(z) = −cu+qsu(z)βEz′ |zJsu(z
′
)+quu(z)βEz′ |zJuu(z
′
)+(1−qsu(z)−quu(z))βEz′ |zVu(z
′
)}
(2.4)
Vs(z) = −cs + qss(z)βEz′ |zJss(z
′
) + (1− qss(z))βEz′ |zVs(z
′
)} (2.5)
Observe that skilled firms can only meet with skilled workers. Moreover,
skilled firms do not differentiate whether the worker they hire is coming from em-
ployment or unemployment. I assume skilled employees of unskilled jobs quit their
jobs at the end of the period if they find a skilled job.5 Thus, in the following period,
they negotiate with a skilled firm as having the same outside option as unemployed
skilled workers. If firms were to differentiate between employment histories, skilled
workers who transit from employment would get higher first period wages, since
they would have had higher outside options (if their jobs did not get destroyed by
exogenous shocks). In this case, skilled firms’ incentives to open vacancies would be
negatively affected, since their expected profits from a job would go down. How-
ever, given the relatively small increase in outside options of employed skilled job
searchers, their small numbers in comparison to unemployed job searchers, and the
fact that outside employment option holds only for the first period will make this
effect small.
5Observe that the model does not differentiate between quits or fires.
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A skilled firm in a match with a skilled worker, has the following optimization
problem:
Jss(z) = max
{
Vs(z), ys(z)−wss(z)+βδsEz′ |zVs(z
′
)+β(1−δs)Ez′ |zJss(z
′
)
}
(2.6)
The firm will choose the better option of either continuing to search or hiring the
skilled worker. If it searches, the firm gets the present discounted value of having a
vacancy, Vs(z). If the firm hires the worker, then they produce in that period, the
firm gets the output net of the worker’s wage, and with some exogenous probability
continues to the following period.
An unskilled firm in a meeting with a worker has an optimization problem
similar to the skilled firm:
Juu(z) = max
{
Vu(z), yu(z)− wuu(z) + βδuEz′ |zVu(z
′
) + β(1− δu)Ez′ |zJuu(z
′
)
}
(2.7)
Jsu(z) = max
{
Vu(z), yu(z)− wsu(z) + fss(z)βEz′ |zVu(z
′
) + β(1− fss(z))δuEz′ |zVu(z
′
)
+ (1− fss(z))(1− δu)βEz′ |zJsu(z
′
)
}
(2.8)
If an unskilled firm considers hiring a skilled worker, the firm takes into
account that the skilled worker searches for a skilled job, thus she may leave the
firm in the following period. On the job search will reduce the value of hiring a skilled
worker as opposed to an unskilled worker. This will be reflected on wages. One would
expect skilled workers to earn less than unskilled for an unskilled job, since skilled
workers need to compensate the firm for higher job termination probability. On
the other hand, skilled workers have higher outside options than unskilled workers.
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Thus, unskilled firms may need to offer skilled workers higher wages for skilled
workers to accept the job offer.
Note that all firms within a skill group are identical, i.e., they all receive the
same output realization. To avoid endogenous separation (which would mean no
employment in that period), one needs to put some restrictions on output values.
Assume that bs < min{ys(1), yu(1)} and bu < yu(1). This assumption guarantees
that even in the worst possible output realization, firms and workers will not en-
dogenously terminate a job.6
2.3.4 Workers’ Bellman Equations
Let Ui(z) denote the discounted present value of unemployment to a worker
with skill type i ∈ {s, u}. The unemployed worker receives some income bi during
the current period and looks for a job. She meets with a skilled and unskilled firm
with some endogenous probabilities, or she does not meet with any firm and remains
unemployed.
Us(z) = bs+fss(z)βEz′ |zWss(z
′
)+fsu(z)βEz′ |zWsu(z
′
)+(1−fss(z)−fsu(z))βEz′ |zUs(z
′
)}
(2.9)
Uu(z) = bu+fus(z)βEz′ |zWus(z
′
)+fuu(z)βEz′ |zWuu(z
′
)+(1−fus(z)−fuu(z))βEz′ |zUu(z
′
)}
(2.10)
An unskilled worker in a meeting with an unskilled firm needs to decide
whether she wants to continue to search or form an employment relationship with
6This restriction on output is sufficient, but not necessary. It is possible to avoid endogenous
separation with lower values of outputs.
51
this firm. If she stays unemployed she receives Uu(z). If she chooses the job, she
receives a wage for the current period and with some exogenous probability keeps
her job in the following period.
Wuu(z) = max
{
Uu(z), wuu(z) +βδuEz′ |zUu(z
′
) +β(1− δu)Ez′ |zWuu(z
′
)
}
(2.11)
The unskilled worker will not be hired by a skilled firm. Thus, if she meets with a
skilled firm, she receives Uu(z).
Wus(z) = Uu(z) (2.12)
A skilled worker has essentially the same optimization problem. If the skilled worker
is in a meeting with an unskilled firm, she takes into account her option of on the
job search when considering the employment relationship with this firm.
Wsu(z) = max
{
Us(z), wsu(z) + fss(z)βEz′ |zWss(z
′
) + β(1− fss(z))δuEz′ |zUs(z
′
)
+ (1− fss(z))(1− δu)βEz′ |zWsu(z
′
)
}
(2.13)
Wss(z) = max
{
Us(z), wss(z) + δsβEz′ |zUs(z
′
)
+ (1− δs)βEz′ |zWss(z
′
)
} (2.14)
2.3.5 Wage Determination
The wage between a firm and a worker is determined through Nash bargain-
ing. Worker’s bargaining power is µij . The worker and the firm bargain over their
share of the match surplus, net of their outside options. A firm’s outside option is
always being vacant. A worker’s outside option is always being unemployed. Note
that workers and firms bargain at the beginning of the period, before job markets
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open. Thus, a skilled worker, regardless of the skill type of the job she is matched
with, has unemployment as her outside option. The bargaining problem between
a firm with skill requirement j and a worker with skill type i can be formalized as
follows:
wij(z) = argmax
[
Jij(z)− Vj(z)
](1−µij)[Wij(z)− Ui(z)]µij , (2.15)
2.4 Equilibrium
For given values of yi(z) and Πi, and initial unemployment rates, the equi-
librium of the model is the set of functions
{
{Jij(z),Wij(z), wij(z)}i,j∈{s,u},
Vs(z), Vu(z) Us(z), Uu(z), ψs(z), vs(z), vu(z), us(z), uu(z)
}
∀z
such that
• the value of vacancies in both sectors is zero (free entry condition):
Vs(z) = 0 (2.16)
Vu(z) = 0 (2.17)
• value functions satisfy equations from (2.5) to 2.14.
• wage rates satisfy equation 3.7.
• The probability that an unskilled firm meets a skilled worker is
ψs(z) =
λ(z)(1− fss(z))pus
(1− p)uu + λ(z)(1− fss(z))pus . (2.18)
• λ(z) = 1 if and only if Ez′ |zWsu(z
′
) > Us(z).
• Flows across employment states are
u
′
u(z) = (1− fuu(z))uu + δu(1− uu) (2.19)
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u
′
s(z) = (1− fss(z)− fsu(z))us + δuesu + δs(1− us − esu(z)) (2.20)
e
′
su(z) = fsu(z)us + (1− δu)esu(1− us − esu). (2.21)
2.4.1 Implications of job competition
Job competition will have effects on the following labor market outcomes.
First of all, job competition affects the job finding probability of skilled workers.
Thus it is expected to reduce their unemployment rate. Moreover, since they com-
pete with unskilled workers, unskilled unemployment rate is expected to go up.
Job competition also has effects on the wages of skilled workers. The option
value of getting unskilled jobs (which should be paying higher wages than unemploy-
ment incomes, otherwise skilled workers would have not participated) strengthens
the bargaining position of skilled workers. Consequently, it is expected to increases
the wages they get at skilled jobs.
Note that these are primary effects. Firms would respond to these effects
in equilibrium. For instance, if there are skilled job searchers in unskilled market,
unskilled firms will have higher expected returns, since they will be more likely to fill
their positions. Thus, the number of unskilled vacancies would go up. As a result,
It is not clear whether job competition would increase the unskilled unemployment
rate.
Moreover, higher outside options of skilled workers would reduce skilled
firms’ incentives to open vacancies since their expected returns would go down.
Thus, job competition would reduce the number of available skilled vacancies, which
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would reduce skilled workers’ wages. Hence, general equilibrium effects makes effects
of job competition on wages and unemployment ambiguous.
2.5 Calibration and Computation
The equilibrium of this economy is characterized by the decision rules for
vacancy creation and the wage determination rules for given values of unemployment
rates and the aggregate state of the economy.
To describe the equilibrium, it is helpful to work with the match surplus
Sij(z), which is defined as follows:
Sij(z) = Wij(z)− Ui(z) + Jij(z)− Vj(z). (2.22)
Moreover, Nash bargaining implies the following relationship between shares workers
and firms get from the surplus.
Wij(z)− Ui(z) = µijSij(z) (2.23)
Using bellman equations and identity 2.23, we get
Sus(z) = 0
Suu(z) = max
{
0, yu(z) + (1− δs)βEz′ |zSuu(z
′
) + βEz′ |zUu(z
′
)− Uu(z)
}
Ssu(z) = max
{
0, yu(z) + (1− fss(z))(1− δu)βEz′ |zSsu(z
′
)− Us(z) + βEz′ |zUs(z
′
)
+ fss(z)βµssEz′ |zSss(z
′
)
Sss(z) = max
{
0, ys(z) + (1− δs)βEz′ |zSss(z
′
) + βEz′ |zUs(z
′
)− Us(z)
}
.
(2.24)
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Similarly, unemployment value functions are
Uu(z) = bu + fuu(z)βµuuEz′ |zSuu(z
′
) + βEz′ |zUu(z
′
)
Us(z) = bs + fss(z)βµssEz′ |zSss(z
′
) + fsu(z)µsuβEz′ |zSsu(z
′
) + βEz′ |zUs(z
′
).
(2.25)
Vacancy value equations become
cu = quu(z)β(1− µuu)Ez′ |zSuu(z
′
) + qsu(z)β(1− µsu)Ez′ |zSsu(z
′
)
cs = qss(z)β(1− µss)Ez′ |zSss(z
′
).
(2.26)
2.5.1 Computing equilibrium
In order to solve for equations (3.12), we need skilled and unskilled mar-
ket tightnesses θs and θu, respectively. Observe that these values also depend on
unemployment rates of the period.
I use the following algorithm to solve for equilibrium:
1. Let Z = {z1, z2, ...., zn2} be the index for the aggregate state of the economy
such that
Z =
{( yu(1)
ys(1)
)
,
(
yu(1)
ys(2)
)
, ...,
(
yu(1)
ys(n)
)
,
(
yu(2)
ys(1)
)
, ...
(
yu(n)
ys(n)
)}
Let Z be the size Nz vector of possible states of the economy, which is governed
by joint probabilities of ys and yu Markov processes.
2. Generate a grid for each of skilled and unskilled unemployment rates, and for
cross skill employment, U s, Uu, Esu, respectively. Let N be the size of teach
of these grids.
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3. Set upper and lower bound for θu and θs. Boundaries are Nz × N × N × N
dimensional quadruples.
4. Guess a θu value within these boundaries. θu(i, j, k,m) is the guess for mar-
ket tightness when the economy has Z(i) shocks, skilled unemployment rate
is U s(j), unskilled unemployment rate is Uu(k), and employment of skilled
workers in the unskilled sector is Esu(m).
5. Guess a θs value within boundaries.
6. Compute job finding and vacancy filling probabilities using guessed values in
equations (2.2) and (2.3).
7. Compute surplus values and unemployment values using equations 3.10 and
3.11, via value function iteration. Notice that one needs to interpolate for
surplus values of the subsequent period to calculate expected surplus values.
8. Compute values of vacancies using equations (3.12).
9. Update guess of θs.
• If Vs > 0; then increase θs.
• If Vs < 0; then decrease θs.
10. Repeat steps starting from step 5 until convergence
11. Update guess of θu.
• If Vu > 0; then increase θu.
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• If Vu < 0; then decrease θu.
12. Repeat steps starting from step 4 until convergence
2.5.1.1 Calibration
In order to solve the system of equations, parameter values should be as-
signed. Parameters of the model are: {p, cs, cu ys, yu δs, δu µs, µu, µsu bs, bu, α, β},
and parameters that govern shocks.
The model period is one month, so β i set to 0.996 to match annual interest
rate of four percent. The skilled fraction of the labor force p is set to 0.27, its average
value from 1996 to 2006. The average value of output produced by unskilled labor
is normalized to 1. Unemployment income is assumed to be the same across skill
groups and is set to 0.54. This number is the average replacement ratio for the U.S..
The matching function is of the form
M(u˜, v) =
u˜v(
u˜ρ + vρ
)1/ρ
The matching parameter is set to 1.1, which gives the equilibrium matching
elasticity of unemployment if the market tightness is the data average. All workers
are assumed to have the same bargaining power, which is 0.36. This number is
generally assumed in the literature (Shimer (2005)).
Shock processes are taken from Hornstein et al (2005). Hornstein et al re-
port that quarterly labor productivity follows an AR1 process with auto-correlation
coefficient of 0.89 and standard deviation of 0.02.7 I assume that the baseline AR1
7Measured as output per worker in the non-farm sector.
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process for both skilled and unskilled output is the same except for the means.
The intent behind this assumption is to generate the interactions only through the
matching markets.
I normalize the average value of unskilled output to 1 and set the average
value of skilled output to 1.79. I use the Tauchen approximation to AR1 processes
to get Markov values and transition probabilities.
yu =
 0.9561
1.044
 , Πu =
 0.804 0.195 0.0010.136 0.727 0.136
0.001 0.195 0.804

ys =
 1.7461.79
1.834
 , Πs =
 0.804 0.195 0.0010.136 0.727 0.136
0.001 0.195 0.804

The remaining parameters are the costs of posting vacancies (cu, cs). They
are set so that the average job finding probabilities of both skill groups are close to
the data.
2.6 Results
To see the effects of job competition on the labor market outcomes of skill
groups, I simulate an economy of 10,000 agents for 1400 periods. I use the last
1100 periods to run the same probit regression as discussed in previous sections on
simulated data.
Table 2.2 shows the coefficients on skilled and unskilled unemployment rates
for probit regressions. Although these coefficients are not the marginal effects, they
have the same sign. The first column of Table 2.2 has the results for the employment
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probability of an unskilled worker. An increase in the unskilled unemployment rate
reduces the employment probability. However, a change in skilled unemployment
rate does not have a significant effect on this probability. The third column of Table
2.2 has probit regression results for the employment probability of a skilled worker.
Skilled unemployment rate affects the probability of being employed for a skilled
worker. However, unskilled unemployment rate is not effective.
These probit regressions suggest that the interaction between labor markets
of skill groups through job competition is not significant enough to influence a
specific skill group’s employment probability. Note that for skilled vacancies changes
in the unskilled sector is not important per se because, due to on the job search,
changes in the unskilled job market does not change the number of skilled job
searchers per se. As discussed earlier, the only other effect is through changes in
skilled workers’ outside options, hence through wages. The probit results suggest
that these secondary effects are not strong enough.
The reason that changes in the skilled unemployment rate does not affect
the employment probability of an unskilled worker is less obvious. One possible
explanation is that skilled workers who search for unskilled jobs are a relatively
small fraction of the total unskilled job searchers. Thus, fluctuations in the number
of skilled workers in the unskilled job market may have small effects on the total
number of unskilled vacancies created.
To see the effects of the existence of job competition on labor market out-
comes, I do the following counterfactual exercise. Using the same values of the
parameters as in the economy with the interaction, I calculate the equilibrium of
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an economy without job competition. Thus, the only difference between these two
economies is the presence of the participation of skilled workers in unskilled job
search, or lack there of. I simulate these two economies for the same shock realiza-
tions. Results are reported on Table 2.3.
The first two columns of Table 2.3 show means and standard deviations of
some variables of the simulated economy with interaction. Numbers in parenthe-
ses are the standard errors. Observe that skilled workers that hold unskilled jobs
are a small fraction of the skilled labor force. The skilled unemployment rate is
lower compared to the unskilled unemployment rate. Note that, on average, skilled
workers are paid slightly higher wages at unskilled jobs than the unskilled workers.
The simulated data moments of the economy without job competition are
displayed in last two columns of the Table 2.3. Note that, the existence of job
competition widens the unemployment rate gap in favor of the skilled workers.
The number of skilled workers who are employed in skilled jobs is almost the
same in both economies. Note that the sum of the number of skilled unemployed
workers and the number of skilled workers employed at unskilled jobs in the economy
with interaction is almost the same as the number of unemployed skilled workers
in the economy with no interaction. Interestingly, the unskilled unemployment rate
decreases in the presence of job competition.
The average value of wages is not affected significantly by the existence
of job competition. This is because in both of these equilibria, the number of
vacancies adjusts so that workers’ outside options do not change significantly enough
to generate wage differences across these economies.
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2.7 Concluding Remarks
What are the implications of the interaction between heterogeneous groups
through matching markets (job competition)? This paper aims to analyze this ques-
tion. Data suggest that a skilled (unskilled) worker’s probability of being employed
is affected by unskilled (skilled) unemployment. Job competition is in line with this
fact.
I use a heterogeneous agents model where the only interaction between differ-
ent groups comes from job competition. I run a probit regression on simulated data
and find that the skilled (unskilled) unemployment rate does not significantly affect
the probability of an unskilled (skilled) worker being employed. I also simulate the
economy in the presence and the absence of job competition. I find that although
the presence of job competition increases unemployment inequality, it reduces both
skilled and unskilled unemployment rates.
Future research should first look at other ways of empirically testing the
relevance of job competition. It is also important to figure out what channels are
more important in generating the interaction we see in the data between labor
market outcomes of different skill groups.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Source
p 0.27 Skilled fraction of Labor Force, average+
β 0.996 interest rate
α 1.1 match elasticity, Pissarides et al (2000)
b 0.54 replacement ration
µu, µs 0.36 Shimer (2005)
δu 0.017 Separation rate of unskilled labor, average+
δs 0.006 Separation rate of skilled labor, average
yu 1 Normalization
ys 1.79 Acemoglu et al (2002?)
+ Average over 1996-2006
Table 2.2: Results: Probit Estima-
tion
P(eu = 1) P(es = 1)
unrtsk -0.001 -19.664
(0.27) (.93)
unrtun -9.34 -.027
(0.254) (0.89)
Table 2.3: Results: Model Moments
Interaction No Interaction
mean std dvn. mean std dvn.
us 0.012 (0.000) 0.020 (0.000)
uu 0.05 (0.002) 0.048 (0.002)
esu 0.01 (0.000) - -
fss 0.276 (0.004) 0.288 (0.006)
fsu 0.235 (0.009) - -
fuu 0.325 (0.012) 0.336 (0.012)
Yu 0.695 (0.024) 0.693 (0.024)
Ys 0.474 (0.009) 0.474 (0.009)
ws 1.65 (0.02) 1.653 (0.030)
wsu 0.983 (0.025) - -
wu 0.955 (0.025) 0.956 (0.026)
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Chapter 3
On the Unemployment Response to a Skill Biased
Technological Change
3.1 Introduction
The higher unemployment rate of less skilled workers and the increasing skill
premium are the stylized facts in labor markets over the last decades. Technologi-
cal change that has favored skilled workers, called skill biased technological change
(SBTC), is one possible explanation for these facts. This paper analyzes the impor-
tance of skill biased vs. neutral shocks in generating labor market facts we see in
the data.
Nickell and Bell (AER, 1996) analyze unemployment rates and wages for
men. They document a rise in both skilled and unskilled unemployment rates as
well as a rise in relative wages of skilled workers from 1970s to 1980s in the US (and
some European countries).1 They argue that demand shift by itself cannot account
for the rise in overall unemployment.
There is a large body of literature that documents a skill biased technological
change (See the review of Katz and Autor (1999) and the references contained
therein). There are also a number of studies that analyze the effect of skill biased
shifts in labor demand on aggregate unemployment. For example, Nickell and Bell
1Also see Katz and Murphy (1992), OECD (1994), and Nickell and Bell (1995)
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(1995) suggest that a SBTC can account for 10 to 30 percent of the rise in overall
unemployment from the 1970s to the 1980s in OECD countries where unemployment
rose significantly. Blanchard and Katz (1997) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
emphasize the importance of labor market institutions in determining the effects
of SBTC on unemployment. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) develop a heterogenous
agents framework and show that SBTC can increase the unskilled unemployment
rate. Krusell, Ohanion, and Rios Rull (2005) look at how SBTC can generate
wage dispersion. They show that capital skill complementarity can account for
most of the variation in skill premia. Stadler and Wapler (2004) endogenize skill
biased technological change and show that it reduces skilled unemployment rate and
increases wage disparity. Cuadras-Morato and Mateos-Planas (2004) show that a
SBTC and increased “employment friction” can account for almost all the variation
in unskilled unemployment, the skill premium, and the increase in skilled labor
force. Cuadras-Morato and Mateos-Planas (2004) also show that SBTC accounts
for almost half of the increase in the skilled unemployment rate.
This paper analyzes how unemployment rates of different skill groups re-
spond to skill biased and neutral shocks, and how these shocks interact with each
other. Although SBTC is known to be important, its interaction with skill neutral
shocks is not well-studied. Exploring the effects of SBTC in the presence of skill
neutral shocks will contribute to our understanding of overall labor markets and
their responses to shocks.
I use a heterogenous labor matching model. There are fixed numbers of
skilled and unskilled workers with an exogenous skill distribution. There are two
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intermediate goods that are produced by workers of a particular skill type. Skilled
and unskilled intermediate goods are produced in final good production. The econ-
omy is hit by two shocks. The first is a skill neutral shock that affects the overall
productiveness of each intermediate good. The other is a skill biased shock that
increases relative productivity of the skilled intermediate good.
The results suggest that the economy responds similar to the skill biased
vs. skill neutral shock. The main difference is in the co-movement of skilled and
unskilled unemployment rates and the volatility of their ratios. When the econ-
omy is hit only by skill neutral shocks (with the realization of the same skill biased
shock every period), then skilled and unskilled unemployment rates move in the
same direction. When the economy is hit by only skill biased shocks, then unem-
ployment rates move in opposite directions. The correlation is stronger, resulting in
less volatility in unemployment ratios. If there are both skill biased and skill neu-
tral shocks in the economy, then unemployment rates move in the same direction,
with less correlation than the case with only skill neutral shocks. In this case, the
volatility of unemployment ratios increases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the model. Computing the equilibrium of the model and calibration of pa-
rameter values are discussed in section 2. The following section documents results,
and section 4 concludes.
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3.2 Model
The economy is inhabited by workers and entrepreneurs. Workers can be
employed or unemployed. If employed, they inelastically supply their labor and
consume wages. If unemployed, they receive unemployment income and search for a
job. There are two types of workers: skilled and unskilled. Skilled workers work in
firms that produce high-tech intermediate goods (skilled firms). Unskilled workers
only work for firms that produce low-tech intermediate good (unskilled firms). Each
firm has only one job. There is also a final good sector. Firms in the final good
sector buy intermediate goods and produce the final good. They do not hire labor.
All these markets are competitive.
Entrepreneurs can stay idle (earn nothing) or start a firm. They can choose
to produce an intermediate good or a final good. If they choose to produce an
intermediate good, they choose the type of the good, they incur a vacancy cost, and
search for workers. If they decide to have a final good producing firm, they buy
the intermediate goods, produce the final good, and sell it. They do not hire extra
labor.
The final good sector is subject to two shocks. The first is “neutral” shock,
denoted by A, which affects productiveness of both skilled and unskilled inputs.
The other shock, ϕ, directly affects the productivity of the skilled intermediate
good. These shocks follow a Markov process with A ∈ {A1, A2..., An} and ϕ ∈
{ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕm}. Let ΠA and Πϕ be the transition matrices where ΠA(i, j)(Πϕ(i, j))
is the probability that the subsequent period’s shock will be Aj(ϕj) if the current
period’s shocks is Ai(ϕi).
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Let z = {A,ϕ} be the aggregate state of the economy. Let Ys(z) and Yu(z)
be the amounts of skilled and unskilled intermediate goods used in production of
the final good, Y (z). Then, the final good production function is
Y (z) = A[γ(ϕYs(z))ρ + (1− γ)Yu(z)ρ]
1
ρ
where γ is the share parameter. Let the final good price be the numeraire, and Ps(z)
and Pu(z) denote the prices of skilled and unskilled intermediate goods, respectively.
Observe that skill biased shock will also affect the unskilled sector through the price
Pu(z).
3.2.1 Intermediate Goods Sectors
3.2.1.1 Workers’ Bellman Equations
Skilled and unskilled workers have similar optimization problems to solve. A
worker, skilled or unskilled, can be in one of two states: employed or unemployed. If
unemployed, the worker receives income bi, where i ∈ {s, u}. Moreover, she searches
for a job. Let Ui(z) denote the value of unemployment for that worker when the
aggregate state of the economy is z.
Ui(z) = bi + β{fi(z)Ez′ |zWi(z
′
) + (1− fi(z))Ez′ |zUi(z
′
)} (3.1)
where β is the discount rate, Wi(z) is the value of being in a match with a firm, and
fi(z) is the probability that the worker will find a job. Although this probability is
exogenous to the worker, it is endogenous to the model.
When the worker is in a match with a firm, she decides whether to attach
to the firm or detach and continue searching. Employed workers receive a wage and
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with an exogenous positive probability 1−si worker’s employment survives into the
subsequent period. The equation below formalizes the value of being in a match
with a firm for a worker.
Wi(z) = max{Ui(z), wi(z) + β{(1− si)Ez′ |zWi(z
′
) + βsiEz′ |zUi(z
′
)}} (3.2)
3.2.1.2 Firms’ Bellman Equations
This section describes the problem faced by intermediate good producers.
There are skilled and unskilled firms which can produce ys and yu amounts of skilled
and unskilled goods, respectively. I assume that skilled jobs are more productive, i.e.
ys > yu. Observe that the amount of output a firm can produce is independent of
the state of the economy. However, firms sell their products to final good producers
at some endogenously determined market price, which is affected by shocks.
A job can be either vacant or filled. A vacant job incurs a cost, cj , where
j ∈ {s, u}. It will be filled with some positive probability, qj(z). A filled job produces
yj , and sells the output at market price Pj(z). Let Vj(z) denote the value of a vacant
job. It can be formally defined as:
Vj(z) = −cj + β{qj(z)Ez′ |zJj(z
′
) + (1− qj(z))Ez′ |zVj(z
′
)} (3.3)
where Jj(z) is the value of being in a match with a worker.
The firm in a match with a worker decides between continuing to search and
hiring the worker. If the job is filled, it produces output yj , sells it at price Pj(z),
and pays the worker wage wj(z). The job will be destroyed in the subsequent period
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with exogenous probability sj .
Jj(z) = max{Vj(z), Pj(z)yj(z)−wj(z) + β{(1− sj)Ez′ |zJj(z
′
) + βsjEz′ |zVj(z
′
)}}
(3.4)
3.2.1.3 Matching and Wage Determination
There are skill specific matching markets. The matching process in each skill
market is presented via a matching function. Arguments of a matching function
are vacancies, vj(z), and unemployment levels, uj of skill type j. Note that the
number of vacancies opened in a given period is a function of the current aggregate
state. However, the current unemployment rate is already determined, as it is a
state vector.2 The matching function is homogenous of degree one, concave, and
increasing in both arguments. If the number of vacancies seeking workers is vj(z)
and M(uj , vj(z)) of them actually are filled, then the probability that a vacancy will
be filled is
qj(z) = M(uj , vj(z))/vj(z) (3.5)
The probability that a worker searching for a job will find one is
fj(z) = M(uj , vj(z))/uj (3.6)
Because the matching function is homogeneous of degree one, these proba-
bilities are functions of vacancy unemployment ratios. Let θj(z) = vj(z)/uj , which
is known as the market tightness. As the market tightness increases, it becomes eas-
ier for an unemployed worker to match with a vacancy. Consequently, an increase
2I do not include that in the vector z for notational convenience.
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in the number of unskilled (skilled) unemployed will decrease the market tightness,
and will make it harder for unskilled (skilled) workers to find a job.
Describing the wage determination process will conclude this section. I as-
sume that workers (firms) get a constant µj (1− µj) fraction of match surplus, net
of their outside options. A worker’s outside option is staying unemployed, whereas
a firm’s outside option is staying vacant. Let Sj denote the match surplus if a firm
with skill type j hires a worker with the same skill type.
Su(z) = Wu(z)− Uu(z) + Ju(z)− Vu(z)
Ss(z) = Ws(z)− Us(z) + Js(z)− Vs(z)
The wage determination rule implies
Wi(z)− Ui(z) = µSi(z) Ji(z)− Vi(z) = (1− µ)Si(z)
Substituting values of Wi(z), Ji(z), Ui(z), and Vi(z) from equations above
into Wi(z)−Ui(z) = µSi(z) (or into Ji(z)−Vj(z) = (1−µ)Si(z)) gives the following
wage equation:
wi(z) = µPj(z)yj(z) + (1− µ)Ui(z)− (1− µ)βEz′ |zUi(z
′
) + µVj(z)− µβEz′ |zVj(z′)
(3.7)
This wage determination rule makes workers and firms unanimously deter-
mine whether parties should form an employment relationship or continue searching.
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3.2.2 Equilibrium
The stationary equilibrium of the model is the set of functions {Js(z), Ju(z),
Vs(z), Vu(z), Ws(z),Wu(z), Us(z), Uu(z), ws(z), wu(z), us, uu, vS(z), vu(z)}, and ini-
tial condition of unemployment, such that
• the value functions satisfy the Bellman equations described above.
• the value of a vacant job is zero (free entry condition); Vs(z) = 0 and Vu(z) = 0.
• wage rates satisfy equation (3.7)
• Prices of final goods are governed by the following functions:
Ps(z) = A[γ(ϕYs(z))ρ + (1− γ)Yu(z)ρ]
1
ρ
−1
γϕρYs(z)ρ−1
Pu(z) = A[γ(ϕYs(z))ρ + (1− γ)Yu(z)ρ]
1
ρ
−1(1− γ)Yu(z)ρ−1
• Intermediate good markets should clear, i.e.
Ys(z) = p(1− us)ys Yu(z) = (1− p)(1− uu)yu
• Flows across employment states are
u
′
u(z) = (1− fu(z))uu + δu(1− uu) (3.8)
u
′
s(z) = (1− fs(z))us + δs(1− us) (3.9)
In this economy, prices of both intermediate goods go up with a positive
shock, whether it is skill biased or neutral. Since the employment levels are deter-
mined at the beginning of the period, realized shocks in the current period do not
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have any effect on the current period employment, resulting in no effect on the cur-
rent period intermediate outputs. However, these shocks affect the current period
prices, thus the current wages. Current period shocks affect future employment,
since they carry information about the future shocks. Firms decide whether to open
vacancies or not by gathering the information about the future from the current
shocks. If firms observe positive shocks in the current state, they know that a posi-
tive shock realization in the next period is more (or less) likely, thus they would have
incentives to open (or not) vacancies in the current period, reducing (or increasing)
the unemployment in the subsequent period.
3.3 Computation and Calibration
The equilibrium of this economy is characterized by decision rules for vacancy
creation and wage determination rules, which are functions of the current period
unemployment rates and aggregate state of the economy.
To describe an equilibrium, it is helpful to work with match surplus Sij(z),
which is defined above.
Using the Bellman equations and the definition of the match surplus, we get
Suu(z) = max
{
0, Pu(z)yu + (1− δs)βEz′ |zSuu(z
′
) + βEz′ |zUu(z
′
)− Uu(z)
}
Sss(z) = max
{
0, Ps(z)ys + (1− δs)βEz′ |zSss(z
′
) + βEz′ |zUs(z
′
)− Us(z)
}
(3.10)
Similarly, unemployment value functions are
Uu(z) = bu + fu(z)βµuEz′ |zSuu(z
′
) + βEz′ |zUu(z
′
)
Us(z) = bs + fs(z)βµsEz′ |zSss(z
′
) + βUs(z
′
)
(3.11)
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Vacancy value equations become
cu = qu(z)β(1− µu)Ez′ |zSuu(z
′
)
cs = qs(z)β(1− µs)Ez′ |zSss(z
′
)
(3.12)
3.3.1 Computing equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model can be characterized by the laws of motion
for unemployment rates and market tightness for the labor markets that clear the
market. Observe that market tightness for a particular labor market (or the number
of vacancies created) is a function of the unemployment rates in both markets (since
these determine the amount of each intermediate good supplied, thus the relative
prices) and the shocks to the economy.
I use the following algorithm to solve for equilibrium:
1. Recall that both shocks follow Markov processes. Let Z = {1, 2, ...., n2} be
the index for the aggregate state of the economy such that
Z =
{( A(1)
ψ(1)
)
,
(
A(1)
ψ(2)
)
, ...,
(
A(1)
ψ(n)
)
,
(
A(2)
ψ(1)
)
, ...
(
A(n)
ψ(n)
)}
Let size of Z be Nz. State of the economy is governed by by joint probabilities
of the Markov processes A and ψ..
2. Generate a grid for skilled and unskilled unemployment rates, Us, Uu, respec-
tively.. Let Ns = Nu be the size of this grid.
3. Generate upper and lower bounds for θu and θs. Boundaries are Nz ×N ×N
dimensional triples.
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4. Guess a θu triple. θu(i, j, k) is the guess for market tightness when the economy
has Z(i) shocks, skilled unemployment rate is Us(j), and unskilled unemploy-
ment rate is Uu(k).
5. Guess a θs triple.
6. Compute job finding and vacancy filling probabilities using the guessed values
in equations (3.5) and (3.6).
7. Compute surplus values and unemployment values using equations 3.10 and
3.11, via value function iteration.
8. Compute values of vacancies using equations (3.12).
9. Update guess of θs using vacancy value for skilled firms Vs.
• If Vs > 0; then increase θs.
• If Vs < 0; then decrease θs.
10. Repeat steps starting from step 5 until convergence
11. Update guess of θu using vacancy value for unskilled firms Vu.
• If Vu > 0; then increase θu.
• If Vu < 0; then decrease θu.
12. Repeat steps starting from step 4 until convergence.
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3.3.2 A Numerical Exercise
In order to solve the system of equations, parameter values should be as-
signed. Parameters of the model are: {p, cs, cu ys, yu δs, δu µs, µu, µsu bs, bu, α, β},
and parameters that govern the shocks.
The model period is one month, so β is set to 0.996 to match the annual
interest rate of four percent. The skilled fraction of the labor force p is set to 0.27,
its average value from 1996 to 2006. The average value of the output produced by
an unskilled firm is normalized to 1. Unemployment income is assumed to be the
same across skill groups and is set to 0.54. This number is the average replacement
ratio for the US. The parameter of the matching function is α = 1.1. The matching
function has the form
M(u, v) =
uv(
uα + vα
)1/α
All workers are assumed to have the same bargaining power, which is 0.36.
This number is generally assumed in the literature (Shimer, 2005).
Acemoglu (2003) argues that the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled labor should be more than 1 (citing Freeman, 1986).Acemoglu sets
this parameter to 1.4. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) assume the elasticity to be 2.
Krusell, Ohanion, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) calibrate the elasticity to 1.67. I
set ρ = 1/3 so that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor
is 1.5.3
3Recall that the elasticity of substitution is 1
1−ρ .
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The remaining parameters are the costs of posting vacancies (cu, cs). They
are set so that the average job finding probabilities of skill groups are close to the
data.
Table 3.1: Parameters
Parameter Value
β Discount Rate 0.996
p High-Skill fraction LF 0.27
ss Job separation rate, skilled 0.006
su Job separation rate, unskilled 0.017
α Matching parameter 1.1
µs Bargaining parameter, skilled 0.36
µu Bargaining parameter, unskilled 0.36
bs Unemployment benefit, skilled 0.54
bu Unemployment benefit, unskilled 0.54
yu Output; unskilled jobs 1
ys Output; skilled jobs 1.79
cs Vacancy cost, skilled 3.94
cu Vacancy cost, unskilled 1.8
γ parameter in agg. production fct 0.4
I assume the processes that govern both skill biased and skill neutral shocks
are the same. This way the only difference between responses to shocks will come
from them being skill biased vs. neutral. I derive values and transition probabilities
of shocks from an underlying AR1 process with standard deviation 0.3 and the auto-
regression coefficient of 0.8. The mean values of these processes are 1.5.4 With these
values, the dispersion between different values of a shock is the same in terms of
percentages. Values and transition probabilities of shocks are:
4I use Tauchen approximation to approximate implied Markov processes, and I assume the
boundary value is 1.
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A =
 11.5
2
 , ΠA =
 0.6915 0.2934 0.01510.2023 0.5953 0.2023
0.0151 0.2934 0.6915

ϕ ==
 11.5
2
 , Πϕ =
 0.6915 0.2934 0.01510.2023 0.5953 0.2023
0.0151 0.2934 0.6915

3.3.3 Results
For given values of parameters, I simulate the time series data for the econ-
omy for the following cases: First, to see the effects of skill neutral shocks on labor
market outcomes, I do the following exercise. I simulate the economy 5000 times.
In each simulation, the first 60 periods the economy receives the following shocks:
A = 1.5, ϕ = 1.5. At 61st period, the shock values are: A = 2, ϕ = 1.5. The econ-
omy receives high skill neutral shock. Then, for the following 250 periods, value
of skill biased shocks are 1.5 for each period, while skill neutral shocks are random
realizations that evolve according to the transition matrix for the skill neutral shock.
Then, I take the averages for each period across simulations to neutralize the effects
of particular shock realizations.
Second, I analyze the effects of skill biased shocks on labor market outcomes.
I simulate the economy 5000 times in this exercise as well. In each simulation, for
the first 60 periods the economy receives the following shocks: A = 1.5, ϕ = 1.5. At
the 61st period, the shock values are: A = 1.5, ϕ = 2. The economy receives high
skill biased shock. Then, for the following 250 periods, value of skill neutral shocks
are 1.5 for each period, while skill biased shocks are random realizations that evolve
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according to the transition matrix for these shocks.
Figure 3.1: Response of Skilled Unemployment to Shocks
Figure 3.1 shows how the skilled unemployment rate responds to skill biased
vs. skill neutral shocks. Since shocks are persistent, after observing a high shock in
the current period, more vacancies are created, resulting in a lower unemployment
in the subsequent period. Observe that, vacancy creation is higher for a skill neutral
shock.
Figure 3.2 shows response of unskilled unemployment rate to skill biased vs.
skill neutral shocks. Like skilled firms, unskilled firms create more vacancies when
they observe high levels of shocks. As a result, unemployment in the subsequent
period is lower. A skill biased shock reduces the unemployment rate of unskilled
workers as well since there is complementarity between unskilled and skilled inter-
mediate goods. Unskilled unemployment is affected more from a skill neutral shock
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Figure 3.2: Response of Unskilled Unemployment to Shocks
compared to the effect of a skill biased shock.
As expected, a skill biased shock, increases the gap between the skilled and
unskilled unemployment rates. Figure 3.3 displays that effect. This happens not
because unskilled unemployment increases, but because the skilled unemployment
rate decreases more. On the other hand, the unskilled unemployment rate declines
relatively more than skilled unemployment rate as a result of a favorable skill neutral
shock.
One parameter that is expected to affects responses of unemployment rates to
shocks is the elasticity of substitution. To see how the economy behaves at different
elasticity levels, I conduct the following exercise. I find the equilibrium for different
ρ values (all other parameters are the same). Then I simulate these economies with
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Table 3.2: Response of the Economy to Different
Elasticities
ρ = 2/3 ρ = 1/3 ρ = −1/3 ρ = −1
( = 3*) ( = 1.5) ( = 0.75) ( = 0.5)
uu 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.054
(0.01) (0.01) (0.010) (0.012)
us 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
fu 0.313 0.314 0.314 0.311
(0.079) (0.079) (0.086) (0.097)
fs 0.329 0.326 0.321 0.316
(0.054) (0.051) (0.046) (0.046)
uu/us 2.913 2.874 2.833 2.839
(0.29) (0.235) (0.273) (0.465)
Yu 0.691 0.692 0.691 0.691
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Ys 0.475 0.474 0.474 0.474
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Y 1.064 1.061 1.055 1.049
(0.299) (0.298) (0.297) (0.296)
Pu 0.912 0.914 0.918 0.921
(0.234) (0.242) (0.266) (0.301)
Ps 0.911 0.901 0.884 0.868
(0.302) (0.273) (0.234) (0.228)
wageu 0.873 0.875 0.878 0.878
(0.151) (0.155) (0.17) (0.190)
wages 1.568 1.553 1.525 1.502
(0.346) (0.315) (0.274) (0.268)
Implied elasticity of substitution  = 1
1−ρ
Values are mean and standard of time series
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Figure 3.3: Response of Unemployment Ratios to Shocks
the same shock realizations for 1000 periods. As Table 3.2 shows, there is not much
difference between these economies in mean values of key variables. There are some
differences across economies in second moments.
As ρ goes down, i.e. elasticity of substitution goes down, we expect less
co-movement between prices of intermediate goods, thus lower correlation between
unemployment rates. However, for different ρ values, response of prices to different
shock states also changes, both quantitatively and qualitatively. That generates
different responses of vacancies to the same state for different ρ values.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter aims to analyze effects of skill biased and skill neutral shocks
on labor market outcomes of different skill groups. Skill based shocks are discussed
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as one of the sources behind higher unemployment and lower wages of unskilled
workers.
I use an otherwise standard search model with a final good sector that uses
skilled and unskilled intermediate goods in production. This sector is hit by two
shocks: a skill biased shock that affects productivity of the skilled intermediate good
and a skill neutral shock that affects overall productivity.
The results show that skilled unemployment is more responsive to skill bi-
ased shocks, compared to unskilled unemployment, than skill neutral shocks. The
unskilled unemployment rate goes down as a result of a favorable skill biased shock,
since goods these skill groups produce are complements. However, a high level skill
biased shock increases the gap between unemployment rates of skill groups (although
it reduces the levels), while a high level of skill neutral shock reduces that gap.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Existence of the Equilibrium
It is easier to work with the match surplus to characterize the equilibrium in
matching models. The match surplus is defined as the sum of the value of a match
to the firm and to the worker, net of their outside options.
S(pi, λ) = J(pi, λ)− V (λ) +W (pi, λ)− U(λ)
Substituting in values of J(pi, λ) and W (pi, λ) from the Bellman equations
result in 1
S(pi, λ) = max
{
E(y|pi) + β(1− δ)piS(1, λ)− (1− β)U(λ)− (1− β)V (λ), 0
}
Note that the match surplus is linear in pi for pi > pi∗, thus we can write the
surplus as S(pi, λ) = (pi − pi∗)S′(pi∗, λ) where S′(pi∗, λ) is 2
S
′
(pi∗, λ) =
yg − yb
1− β(1− δ)(1− pi∗) (A.1)
1One can write wages as a function of match surplus as well
w(pi, λ) = (1− β)U(λ) + µS(pi, λ)− β(1− δ)µpiS(1, λ)
2I take the derivative of S(pi, λ) with respect to pi, substitute S(1, λ) = (1 − pi∗)S′(pi∗, λ) in,
and rearrange the terms to get this expression.
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The equilibrium can be characterized by three variables. These are reserva-
tion probability, market tightness, and the choice of the employee selection technol-
ogy. For a given value of λ, the values of (θλ, pi∗λ) are determined by the intersection
of two curves: the optimal match formation curve (OMF) and the free entry curve
(FE).
The optimal match formation curve delivers the reservation probability for
any given market tightness level. Recall that the pi∗λ leaves workers and firms indif-
ferent between forming the production unit or staying unattached, i.e., it solves
the equation S(pi∗λ) = 0. Using this condition, and substituting S
′
(pi∗, λ) into
S(pi∗λ, λ) = 0 equation yields
(1− β)U(λ) = yb + pi∗λS
′
(pi∗, λ)
We can rewrite the equation above3
θλµ
c+ λκ
(1− µ) = (y
b − b) + pi∗λS
′
(pi∗λ, λ) (A.2)
Note that pi∗λS
′
(pi∗λ, λ) is increasing in pi
∗
λ. Thus, we have an upward sloping
line in the (pi∗λ, θλ) space. The intuition for the upwards sloping optimal match
3Recall that in equilibrium
(1− β)U(λ) = b+ βf(θ)µ
{
λ
∫ 1
0
S(pi, λ)dΩ + (1− λ)
∫ 1
0
S(pi, λ)dΓ
}
(1− β)V (λ) = −c− λκ+ βq(θ)(1− µ)
{
λ
∫ 1
0
S(pi, λ)dΩ + (1− λ)
∫ 1
0
S(pi, λ)dΓ
}
Substituting for surplus values from V (λ) equation into U(λ) equations yields
(1− β)U(λ) = b+ θµc+ λκ
1− µ
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formation curve is as follows: At any (θ, pi∗λ) pair on the curve, we know that the
match surplus is zero. As market tightness increases, so does the worker’s outside
option (firm’s outside option is always zero in equilibrium). Since the worker’s
outside option is higher at the new market tightness, the match surplus at the new
market tightness with the old reservation probability will be negative. Thus, the
firm and the worker will decide to separate. They will be indifferent between being
unattached and forming a production unit at a higher pi∗λ level, resulting in a positive
slope.
The second curve that determines the equilibrium is the free entry (or va-
cancy creation) condition. We get this condition in the following way: The equi-
librium value of the market tightness should be such that the vacancies earn zero
profit in equilibrium, i.e., θλ solves V (λ) = 0; thus
c+ λκ = βq(θ)(1− µ)
(
λ
∫ 1
pi∗λ
S(pi, λ)dΩ + (1− λ)
∫ 1
pi∗λ
S(pi, λ)dΓ
)
(A.3)
Note that, since S(pi, λ) is linear in pi, we can write the expected surplus as follows:∫ 1
0
S(pi, λ)d· = S′(pi∗λ, λ)
∫ 1
pi∗λ
(
pi − pi∗)d·
Thus, the free entry condition can be written as
c+ λκ = βq(θ)(1− µ)S′(pi∗λ, λ)
(
λ
∫ 1
pi∗λ
[pi − pi∗λ]dΩ + (1− λ)
∫ 1
pi∗λ
[pi − pi∗λ]dΓ (A.4)
Since both S
′
(pi∗λ, λ) and
∫ 1
pi∗λ
[pi−pi∗λ]d· are decreasing in pi∗λ, this equation has
a negative slope in (pi∗λ, θλ) space. The intuition for the downward sloping free entry
curve is as follows: As the pi∗λ increases, it gets harder for firms to find workers, thus
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Figure A.1: Existence of Equilibrium
they need to incur vacancy costs longer (value of opening a vacancy decreases), thus
the number of vacancies, and hence the market tightness, goes down.
These two curves are required to intersect for the existence of an equilib-
rium. To get the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, I need a functional
form for the firms’ matching probability. I assume the matching function to be
M =
uv
(uα + vα)
1
α
to derive the condition below.
Proposition 1. If
(c+ λκ)(1− β(1− δ))
β(yg − yb)
(
λ
∫ 1
0 pidΩ + (1− λ)
∫ 1
0 pidΓ
) < 1, then for any λ ∈ [0, 1]
there is a pair (pi∗λ, θλ) such that equations (6) and (8) are satisfied.
Proof. Since the OMF and the FE curves have monotonically increasing and de-
creasing slopes, respectively, it is sufficient to show that there exists pi1, pi2 such
that
pi1 < pi2, θOMF (pi1) < θFE(pi1) and θOMF (pi2) > θFE(pi2)
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Then, by intermediate value theorem, there exists pi∗ ∈ [pi1, pi2] such that θOMF (pi∗) =
θFE(pi∗)
As pi2 be a number close to 1. As pi goes to 1, θFE(pi) goes to zero. Moreover,
θOMF (1) =
(1− µ)
µ(c+ λκ)
(yg − b) > 0. Thus for a value of pi2 close to 1; θOMF (pi2) >
θFE(pi2).
Let pi1 = 0.
θOMF (pi1) =
(1− µ)
µ(c+ λκ)
(yb − b) ≤ 0
Substituting q(θ) =
1
(1 + θα)(1/α)
and rearranging terms yields
θFE(pi1) =
[β(1− µ)(yg − yb)(λ ∫ 10 pidΩ + (1− λ) ∫ 10 pidΓ)
(c+ λκ)(1− β(1− δ))
α
− 1
]1/α
If,
β(1− µ)(yg − yb)
(
λ
∫ 1
0 pidΩ + (1− λ)
∫ 1
0 pidΓ
)
(c+ λκ)(1− β(1− δ)) > 1, then θFE(pi1) > 0. Conse-
quently, θOMF (pi1) < θFE(pi1).
The inequality will not hold if the means of distributions are sufficiently close
to zero, the output difference by the quality of a match is implausibly small, or the
total cost of opening a vacancy is implausibly high4. The condition does not bind
for any plausible parameter values.
For a given λ, (θλ, pi∗λ) pair is an equilibrium if firms do not deviate from
4Examples of such implausible values would include the total vacancy cost to be 200 times
higher than the low quality output, high quality output to be less than one per cent higher than
the low quality output, or the mean of the distributions to be 0.01.
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their selection technology choice, i.e, if the following condition is satisfied.∫ 1
pi∗λ
(pi − pi∗λ)dΩ∫ 1
pi∗λ
(pi − pi∗λ)dΓ

≥ c+κc if λ = 1
= c+κc if λ ∈ (0, 1)
≤ c+κc if λ = 0
(A.5)
Observe that it is possible to have multiple equilibria. Recall that other
firms’ actions affect the firm via affecting the outside option of workers, thus affecting
the wages the firm pays. Whether there are multiple equilibria depends on how
market tightness reacts to changes in λ (which depends on the parameter values).
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Appendix B
Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Probit Estimation
CMAs used in probit estimation
1. New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island, NY–NJ–CT–PA
2. Los Angeles–Riverside–Orange County, CA
3. Chicago–Gary–Kenosha, IL–IN–WI
4. Washington–Baltimore, DC–MD–VA–WV
5. San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose, CA
6. Philadelphia–Wilmington–Atlantic City, PA–NJ–DE–MD
7. Boston–Worcester–Lawrence, MA–NH–ME–CT
8. Detroit–Ann Arbor–Flint, MI
9. Dallas–Fort Worth, TX
10. Houston–Galveston–Brazoria, TX
11. Miami–Fort Lauderdale, FL
12. Seattle–Tacoma–Bremerton, WA
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